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HEALTHCARE PROMISES FOR PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES 
Natalya Shnitser* 
State and local governments have promised nearly $1 trillion in retiree healthcare 
benefits to public employees. Although retiree healthcare benefits represent a form 
of compensation, historically, state and local governments have not set aside any 
money to pay for the promised benefits. Compensating employees with promises of 
future benefits has enabled state legislatures to use public dollars for other 
priorities, while ignoring the growing liabilities associated with the healthcare 
promises. As these liabilities have come due, they have strained state and local 
budgets. Some public employers have simply cut the benefits, and public employees 
have had limited recourse to hold cities and states to their original deal. 
At the same time, many public employers have actually begun to pay down their 
unfunded liabilities for retiree healthcare. In 2004, new disclosure requirements 
forced state and local governments to acknowledge the full scope of their 
commitments for post-employment benefits. By 2015, some 35 state legislatures had 
created irrevocable trusts to set aside assets for benefits due in future years. 
However, while some of the trusts—most notably some that cover state legislators 
and judges—have accumulated assets to cover the liabilities, other trusts have 
remained glaringly empty. Using newly collected data on over 100 state-
administered retiree healthcare plans, this Article shows that stronger constraints 
on legislative control over funding decisions, as well as stronger measures of fiscal 
health at the state level, have been associated with better funding progress. 
Ultimately, this Article contends that although the trend toward prefunding is 
encouraging, the current legal framework regulating retiree healthcare benefits 
impedes serious funding efforts. Disclosure requirements and governance reforms 
can promote funding discipline and mitigate uncertainty in the short term. In the 
                                                                                                            
 *  David and Pamela Donohue Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. 
I would like to thank Maria O’Brien Hylton, Brendan S. Maher, Patricia McCoy, Amy B. 
Monahan, Kathryn L. Moore, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane M. Ring, Roberta Romano, and the 
participants of the National Employee Benefits & Social Insurance Conference, the Fiduciary 
Law Workshop, the National Tax Association Annual Meeting, the Canadian Law & 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Liberty Mutual New Scholars Workshop on 
Insurance Law and Risk, and the faculty workshops at the University of Houston
Law Center, the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, and Boston College 
Law School for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
370 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:369 
long term, any significant resolution requires a deeper rethinking of employer 
promises for post-employment healthcare benefits and of the institutions best suited 
to manage such promises for decades to come. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State and local governments have promised nearly $1 trillion in retiree 
healthcare benefits to public-sector employees.1 Public-sector employees accept 
relatively lower cash salaries with the belief and expectation that retiree healthcare 
benefits—like pensions—constitute a part of their total compensation and that such 
benefits will be available to them once they retire.2 
                                                                                                            
 1. See Byron Lutza & Louise Sheiner, The Fiscal Stress Arising from State and 
Local Retiree Health Obligations, 38 J. HEALTH ECON. 130, 130 (2014) (finding that “total 
unfunded accrued liability of state and local governments for the provision of retiree health 
care exceeds $1 trillion”); Alicia H. Munnell et al., How Big a Burden Are State and Local 
OPEB Benefits?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C. 14 (2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/slp_48.pdf (estimating the value of 2012-2013 other post-
employment benefits to be $862 billion). 
 2. CAROL H. SPAIN ET AL., S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, RISING U.S. STATE POST-
EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT LIABILITIES SIGNAL AN UNSUSTAINABLE TREND 13 (2016), 
http://www.nasra.org/files/Topical%20Reports/OPEB/SandPStateOPEB1609.pdf (“[S]tate 
governments have managed a longstanding tradeoff between lower wages than many private 
sector positions, but stronger benefits.”); Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Overpaid or 
Underpaid? A State-by-State Ranking of Public Employee Compensation 7–8 (AEI Econ. 
Pol’y Working Paper 2014-04 2014), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/-
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The challenge, put simply, is that public employers have not set aside 
money to pay for the promised benefits.3 Compensating employees with promises 
of future benefits—rather than with cash—has enabled state legislatures to use 
public dollars for other competing priorities and needs, while ignoring the growing 
liabilities associated with the healthcare promises. As these liabilities have come 
due, they have strained state and local budgets4 and prompted efforts to cut or curtail 
                                                                                                            
biggs-overpaid-or-underpaid-a-statebystate-ranking-of-public-employee-compensation_112 
536583046.pdf (observing that “salaries are only one component of total employee 
compensation, which also includes fringe benefits such as health coverage, pensions, and paid 
leave” and finding that “compared to pensions, implicit compensation through [retiree 
healthcare benefits] is far more variable from one state to another”). 
 3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-223, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND 
HEALTH BENEFITS 21 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“Unlike most pension plans, retiree 
health benefits have generally been financed on a pay-as-you-go basis . . . . [S]tate and local 
governments have not set aside funds in a trust reserved for future retiree health costs. Instead, 
governments pay for each year’s retiree health benefits from the current year’s budget.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. State Controller, State Controller Yee Updates 
State Retiree Health Care Liability (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_18191.html (observing that “the mounting cost of 
providing health care benefits to public sector workers” is “one of the greatest fiscal 
challenges facing California”); Heather Gillers, States Need $645 Billion to Pay Full Health-
Care Costs, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-
need-645-billion-to-pay-for-these-promises-and-thats-not-counting-what-they-owe-in-
pensions-1505899801 (noting that “rising retiree health-care costs are compounding 
government pressures when many state and local officials are struggling to manage their 
ballooning pension liabilities and balance their budgets”); Kyle Glazier, California Cites 
OPEB Progress in Labor Deal, BOND BUYER (Sept. 10, 2015, 12:48 PM), 
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/california-cites-opeb-progress-in-labor-deal (observing 
that retiree healthcare liabilities “are a growing concern for issuers of municipal bonds who 
have begun to realize that aging populations and in some cases years of underfunding have 
left them looking at the possibility of unsustainable costs in coming years”); see also Tyler 
Clifford, Snyder Creates Task Force to Address Pension Reform, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. 
(Feb. 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170207/NEWS/170209859/
snyder-creates-task-force-to-address-pension-reform (noting that “more than 330 
municipalities offer either retiree health care or a retiree defined benefit pension plan” and 
that “there is approximately $10 billion in total unfunded health care liabilities and $4 billion 
in unfunded pension liabilities”); Liz Farmer, The Week in Public Finance: Unsustainable 
Health-Care Costs, an Oil State Not in Crisis and More, GOVERNING (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-finance-roundup-health-texas.html (noting 
that in recent years, “[retiree healthcare] benefits have been getting more attention from 
lawmakers”). 
372 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:369 
the benefits.5 Vulnerable employees and retirees have had limited recourse to hold 
cities and states to their original deal.6 
More recently, many public employers have begun to pay down their 
unfunded liabilities for retiree healthcare. Over the last decade, as new disclosure 
requirements have forced state and local governments to acknowledge the full scope 
of their commitments for retiree healthcare, state legislatures have created 
irrevocable trusts to set aside assets for benefits due in future years. The proliferation 
                                                                                                            
 5. See, e.g., ALEX BROWN & JOSHUA FRANZEL, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T 
EXCELLENCE & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, SPOTLIGHT ON RETIREE HEALTH 
CARE BENEFITS FOR STATE & LOCAL EMPLOYEES IN 2014, at 2 (2014), http://slge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/OPEB-Spotlight-12.14.pdf (reporting that in 2014, 61% of state and 
local government human-resource executives reported making changes to contain retiree 
healthcare costs); see also Laura A. Bischoff, Retiree Health Care Cuts Looming for Cops 
and Firefighters in Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 2:49 PM), 
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/retiree-health-care-cuts-looming-for-cops-and-
firefighters-ohio/znKbsUFZtZfPOHsi2xbbFO/ (reporting that as of 2019, “retired cops and 
firefighters will no longer receive health care benefits through the Ohio Police & Firefighters 
Pension Fund but instead will receive a stipend to buy coverage on the open market”); 
Jameson Cook, Macomb County Government Retirees Argue for Health-Care Benefits, 
MACOMB DAILY (Apr. 11, 2017, 1:48 PM), 
http://www.macombdaily.com/article/MD/20170411/NEWS/170419913 (describing how 
the county had reduced benefits for retirees and noting the nearly seven years of subsequent 
litigation over whether the retiree health benefits had vested pursuant to the labor contract in 
effect from 2008-2010). 
 6. See infra Section I.B. For employees, retirees, and beneficiaries, changes to 
the scope and availability of healthcare benefits in retirement frustrate expectations, limit 
planning, and expose such individuals to significant financial risk. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the availability of retiree health insurance affects savings behavior during 
working years, such that public employees covered by retiree health insurance accumulate 
substantially less wealth than similar private-sector employees without such insurance. See 
Robert L. Clark & Olivia S. Mitchell, How Does Retiree Health Insurance Influence Public 
Sector Employee Saving?, 38 J. HEALTH ECON. 109, 114 (2014) (finding that “state/local 
workers with retiree health insurance accumulated about $69,000 [or 15%] less net wealth 
than their uninsured private sector counterparts”). At the same time, public employees must 
contend with the rising costs of healthcare in retirement. Expenses not covered by Medicare 
are currently estimated to exceed $120,000 per retiree, not including the cost of over-the-
counter medications, dental services, and long-term care. See Paul Fronstin & Jack 
VanDerhei, Savings Medicare Beneficiaries Need for Health Expenses: Some Couples Could 
Need as Much as $350,000, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INS. 5 fig.3 (2017), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_Hlth-Svgs.v38no1_31Jan17.pdf. In short, 
the cost of healthcare in retirement represents a kind of unexpected burden for which many 
are unprepared. See Tawny Elgatian, Retiree Health Costs Seen as Unexpected Burden, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/retiree-health-costs-b57982084380/ 
(“Retirement calculators focus on withdrawal rates and interest on investments but fail to 
identify one of the biggest costs of retirement—the cost of health care.”); see also Melissa 
McInerney et al., How Much Does Out-Of-Pocket Medical Spending Eat Away at Retirement 
Income? (CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C., Working Paper 2017-13, Oct. 2017), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/wp_2017-13.pdf (finding that the adequacy of 
retirement income is substantially reduced by high out-of-pocket healthcare costs). 
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of such trusts across 35 states has set into motion what this Article terms the trust 
revolution in retiree healthcare benefits. 
Can the newly established trusts ensure that the promised benefits are paid? 
To answer that question, this Article analyzes newly collected data on over 100 
state-administered retiree healthcare plans. Drawing on the empirical analysis, this 
Article makes four key contributions to the existing scholarship on post-employment 
benefits.7 
First, this Article catalogs the form of and the legal framework for the 
retiree healthcare benefits traditionally provided to public-sector employees. In the 
absence of overarching federal regulation, no two retiree healthcare plans are alike 
in the benefits provided or in the governance structures imposed by the states. Nor 
is the legal status of the benefits consistent across plans. Under the current legal 
framework, public-employer promises to provide retiree healthcare benefits are 
legally binding only to the extent that there is a “contract” between the state and the 
plan participants. Yet the very nature of the benefit—that is, some form of subsidy 
for healthcare costs to be provided decades after the time of the initial agreement—
makes contracting especially difficult. Public employers and employees rarely 
specify the complete range of permissible modifications to the benefits in place at 
the time of agreement. In practice, therefore, the scope of legal protections against 
benefit reductions turns on the public employees’ ability to show that some 
combination of applicable statutory provisions, collective-bargaining terms, and 
employer conduct establishes a contractual obligation for the state government. 
                                                                                                            
 7. In recent years, scholars have focused extensively on public-sector pensions; 
but the challenges posed by post-employment healthcare benefits have been largely 
overlooked. See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell et al., The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 
2012–2016, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C. (2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/slp_32.pdf; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE 
(2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewpensio 
nsupdatepdf.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS 
AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012); Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 3, 5 (2013); Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and Local 
Pension Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 538, 538–42 (2009); Gordon Butler, One Fund 
Solution and the Pension Crisis, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 769 (2016); Jonathan Barry Forman, 
Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 867–73 (2009); Richard E. 
Mendales, Federalism and Fiduciaries: A New Framework for Protecting State Benefit 
Funds, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 503 (2014); Amy B. Monahan, When a Promise Is Not a Promise: 
Chicago-Style Pensions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 356 (2017); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. 
Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 
2011, 1215–16 (2011). The scholarship on public-sector retiree healthcare benefits has been 
quite limited. For recent work on the subject, see ROBERT L. CLARK & MELINDA SANDLER 
MORRILL, RETIREE HEALTH PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: IS THERE A FUNDING CRISIS? 
(2010); Jenna Amato Moran, Comment, The OPEB Tsunami: Riding the Wave of Public 
Sector Postemployment Health Benefits, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 677 (2010); John Sanchez, The 
Vesting, Modification, and Financing of Public Retiree Health Benefits in Light of New 
Accounting Rules, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1147 (2008). 
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The second contribution of this Article is to chronicle how financial- 
reporting changes enacted by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(“GASB”) in 2004 spurred dramatic changes in funding policies. In its 2004 
pronouncement, GASB determined that even in the absence of strict legal 
protections for retiree healthcare benefits, public employers have a constructive 
obligation for the benefits “because of the understanding by employees that there is 
a promise of a benefit to be received in the future in exchange for their current 
services.”8 Failing to include the value of such obligations in annual financial reports 
would leave taxpayers, bondholders, and ratings agencies with an incomplete 
assessment of the financial health of the reporting government.9 Accordingly, GASB 
moved to require public employers to report the value of the benefits already earned 
and those expected to be earned by employees in the future, together with the value 
of any assets set aside to pay for such benefits.10 Although the rules in no way 
imposed any funding requirements on plan sponsors, the rules nevertheless created 
strong incentives—at least from an accounting perspective—to establish and make 
contributions to GASB-compliant trusts.11 Whereas pay-as-you-go funding had 
been the long-standing norm, by 2015, two-thirds of state-administered retiree 
healthcare plans had established irrevocable trusts to set aside assets for benefits not 
yet due. 
                                                                                                            
 8. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 45: ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 
BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS 77 (2004) 
[hereinafter GASB 45]. 
 9. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY OF GASB STATEMENTS NO. 43 AND NO. 45, at 1, 
http://www.gasb.org/resources/ccurl/553/517/opeb_summary.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) 
(stating that without the inclusion of accrued retiree healthcare liabilities, “the readers of 
financial statements, including the public, have incomplete information with which to assess 
the cost of public services and to analyze the financial position and long-run financial health 
of a government”). 
 10. GASB has no enforcement power, but most state and local governments seek 
to comply with GASB standards. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION & EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
LAW 913 (6th ed. 2015) (noting that some state and local governments are required by statute 
to comply with GASB standards, while others do so to maintain good standing in the 
municipal bond markets). 
 11. In its latest guidance, GASB set forth the following criteria for retiree 
healthcare trusts:  
Contributions from employers . . . and earnings on those contributions are 
irrevocable. [Retiree healthcare] plan assets are dedicated to providing 
[retiree healthcare] to plan members in accordance with the benefit terms. 
[Retiree healthcare] plan assets are legally protected from the creditors of 
employers, nonemployer contributing entities, the [retiree healthcare] plan 
administrator, and the plan members.  
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. 
STANDARDS NO. 75: ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS, at i–ii (2015) [hereinafter GASB 75], 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176166144750&accept
edDisclaimer=true. 
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Establishing the trusts, however, has not ensured actual funding. While 
some retiree healthcare trusts have accumulated assets to offset accrued liabilities, 
other trusts have remained glaringly empty. For example, as of 2015, the Rhode 
Island retiree healthcare plans for legislators and judges were more than 100% 
funded, while the plan for state employees was just 15% funded.12 In the same year, 
the Massachusetts plan for state employees was just 4% funded.13 Why have some 
retiree healthcare plans established dedicated trusts, while others have not? Why 
have some public employers made contributions to fund the accrued liabilities, while 
others have contributed almost nothing? 
This Article’s third contribution is the empirical analysis showing that 
previously overlooked differences in plan-level governance, as well as in state-level 
fiscal conditions, are associated with the striking variation in funding progress. At 
the plan level, greater administrative experience with post-employment trusts—as 
evident in retiree healthcare plans administered by pension systems—has been 
associated with a higher rate of trust formation. Once the trusts are in place, stronger 
constraints on legislative control over annual funding decisions—typically through 
the delegation of authority to plan actuaries—have been associated with more 
disciplined contributions to the trusts and overall higher funding levels. Higher 
funding levels have likewise characterized a subset of plans that cover judges and 
legislators. At the state level, the empirical analysis highlights the competition for 
limited public resources. Insofar as pension and retiree healthcare plans draw from 
the same public funds and are considered collectively in state credit ratings, retiree 
healthcare plans in states with relatively well-funded pension plans appear less likely 
to have trusts. Where trusts have been established, better pension plan funding is 
associated with worse funding discipline for retiree healthcare plans. By the same 
token, retiree healthcare plans in states with stronger fiscal positions have exhibited 
better funding discipline and higher funding levels. 
Finally, this Article assesses the security of retiree healthcare benefits in 
the wake of the trust revolution. Significant accumulation of assets could limit 
instances where fiscally stressed public employers seek to reduce or eliminate 
benefits. But the current legal framework regulating retiree healthcare benefits 
impedes the serious funding efforts needed to meet existing retiree healthcare 
obligations. Even with the proliferation of retiree healthcare trusts, so long as there 
is uncertainty over whether such obligations constitute binding legal contracts, some 
state and local governments will be reluctant to commit resources to irrevocable 
trusts.14 While additional disclosure requirements and specific governance reforms 
                                                                                                            
 12. GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., RHODE ISLAND STATE EMPLOYEES’ AND 
ELECTING TEACHERS OPEB ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT A-2 (2015), 
http://controller.admin.ri.gov/documents/Other%20Post%20Employment%20Benefits/5_Ac
tuarial%20Valuation_06-30-2013.pdf. 
 13. THOMAS G. SHACK III, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2015, at 
134 (2015), http://www.mass.gov/comptroller/docs/reports-audits/cafr/fy2015-cafr.pdf. 
 14. Some commentators have warned state and local governments to avoid 
creating trusts to not strengthen the legal protections for nonpension benefits. See, e.g., 
DANIEL DISALVO & STEPHEN EIDE, THE OPEB OFF-RAMP: HOW TO PHASE OUT STATE AND 
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can promote transparency and funding discipline in the short term, this Article 
suggests that any significant long-term resolution requires a deeper rethinking of 
employer promises for post-employment healthcare and of the institutions best 
suited to manage such promises for decades to come. 
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the history of retiree 
healthcare benefits in the United States. After describing the legal status of retiree 
healthcare benefits and the traditional approach to funding, Part I chronicles the 
disclosure changes enacted by the GASB in 2004 and the impact of such changes on 
public employers’ funding policies. Part II introduces newly collected data and turns 
to an empirical analysis of the varied responses to the new GASB rules. Finally, Part 
III assesses the impact of the trust revolution on the security of the promised benefits 
and the future of retiree healthcare in the United States. 
I. THE PROMISE OF HEALTHCARE BENEFITS IN RETIREMENT 
In the era of the gig economy and the “Uberization of everything,” the idea 
that an employer would subsidize health insurance not only for its current 
employees, but also for its retired employees, may seem increasingly difficult to 
fathom.15 Yet, such practices were once commonplace among both private and 
public U.S. employers. In the 1970s, nearly three-quarters of all employer-sponsored 
health plans extended coverage to retired employees.16 Soaring healthcare costs in 
the 1980s, together with a change in accounting rules in 1990, prompted many 
private-sector employers to terminate their retiree healthcare benefits.17 
Accordingly, while the vast majority of private employers have eliminated retiree 
healthcare benefits,18 most state and local government employers continue to 
                                                                                                            
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ RETIREE HEALTH CARE COSTS 13 (2016); Daniel DiSalvo & Stephen 
Eide, Stop! Why States and Localities Should Stop Providing Retiree Healthcare, BOND 
BUYER (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.bondbuyer.com/opinion/stop-why-states-and-localities-
should-stop-providing-retiree-healthcare (suggesting that prefunding is a “mistake” that 
would “affir[m] governments’ commitment” to retiree healthcare benefits). 
 15. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Uber Retirement, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 440–
41. 
 16. Brief of Amici Curiae Labor & Benefits Law Professors in Support of 
Respondents at 2, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-
1010), 2014 WL 4749499, at *2 (noting that in the middle of the last century, health insurance 
was inexpensive and, by 1974, nearly three-quarters of employer-sponsored health plans 
extended coverage to retirees with the intention that such benefits would vest). 
 17. See infra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Kathryn L. Moore, The New 
Retiree Health VEBAs, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7-1, 7-3 to 7-4 (Alvin D. Lurie, ed. 2008).  
 18. See generally Paul Fronstin & Nevin Adams, Employment-Based Retiree 
Health Benefits: Trends in Access and Coverage 1997‒2010, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 5 
(2012), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-2012_No377_RetHlth.pdf (“Very 
few private-sector employers currently offer retiree health benefits, and the number offering 
them has been declining. . . . In 2010, 17.7 percent of workers were employed at 
establishments that offered health coverage to early retirees, down from 28.9 percent in 
1997.”). More recently, employers ranging from General Electric and Honeywell to Meritor 
and Howard University have sought to curtail retiree health benefits. See, e.g., Danielle 
Douglas-Gabriel, Howard University Ends Group Health Plan for Some Retirees, WASH. 
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provide such benefits for public employees.19 This Part first describes the range of 
public-sector plans and the range of the systems that states have set up to administer 
them. It then turns to the nature of the retiree healthcare promise and the traditional 
approach to plan funding. Whereas plan design, governance, and even legal status 
vary across plans, until GASB reformed the reporting requirements for retiree 
healthcare benefits sponsored by public employers, pay-as-you-go funding was the 
standard approach among state-administered plans. 
A. Variation in Employer Plans 
In addition to traditional pension benefits, state and local governments 
provide a wide range of retiree healthcare benefits to public-sector retirees who have 
met the applicable eligibility criteria.20 Retiree healthcare benefits include continued 
access to employer-sponsored health insurance for retirees not yet eligible for 
Medicare (the so-called early retirees21), as well as a variety of plans for retirees 
ages 65 and older (the so-called Medicare-eligible retirees) to supplement Medicare 
or offset certain out-of-pocket costs. In 2014, 84% of state employees had access to 
retiree healthcare benefits after turning 65, while 86% had access to employer-
sponsored retiree healthcare benefits for early retirees.22 
Despite the widespread availability of retiree healthcare plans, in the 
absence of overarching federal regulation, the quality and cost of the healthcare 
benefits have varied widely across plans. As Table 1 illustrates, heterogeneity in 
                                                                                                            
POST (May 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2017/05/05/howard-university-ends-group-health-plan-for-some-retirees/?utm_ 
term=.262e6803677c; GE Retirees Decry Health Care Changes, CTPOST.COM (Apr. 27, 
2017, 1:31 PM) http://www.ctpost.com/business/article/GE-retirees-decry-health-care-
changes-11103777.php; Jacklyn Wille, Honeywell’s Retiree Health Cuts Divide Federal 
Judges, BLOOMBERG BNA: PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/honeywells-retiree-health-n73014448828/. 
 19. CLARK & MORRILL, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 20. As a matter of terminology, retiree healthcare benefits are considered a type 
of non-pension or “other post-employment benefit” (“OPEB”). OPEBs include retiree 
healthcare benefits, as well as life insurance, disability, and long-term care insurance. Of 
these, the health benefits are by far the most common and the costliest OPEB and hence the 
focus of this Article. Ronald A. Wirtz, OPEBs: What Lies Beneath the Balance Sheet, RES. 
BANK MINNEAPOLIS: FEDGAZETTE (Apr. 7, 2011), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/OPEBs-what-lies-beneath-the-
balance-sheet (noting that within the category of non-pension postemployment benefits, 
healthcare is the “elephant in terms of cost”). 
 21. For early retirees, prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, continued 
access to employer coverage saved many from the “financial disaster” of having to obtain 
individual insurance coverage. For such early retirees, pre-existing medical conditions and 
other underwriting criteria had made obtaining quality individual health insurance 
“forbiddingly expensive, if not completely impossible.” Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at 
Risk: The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 287, 291 (2009). 
 22. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.42 (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2014/ownership/govt/table42a.pdf. 
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state law and in collective-bargaining dynamics has produced public-sector retiree 
healthcare plans that differ in the eligibility criteria to qualify for the benefits, the 
generosity of the plan terms, and the proportion of the premiums covered by 
employers.23 The benefits range from unsubsidized access to employer-sponsored 
health insurance to full coverage of retiree health-insurance premiums.24 A number 
of plans today offer fixed-dollar monthly subsidies for Medicare eligible retirees. 
  
                                                                                                            
 23. Michael Nadol et al., Managing Public-Sector Retiree Health-Care Benefits 
under the Affordable Care Act, GOV’T FIN. REV., Apr. 2014, at 11, 11–13; CLARK & MORRILL, 
supra note 7, at 26–83. 
 24. PEW CHARITABLE TR. & MACARTHUR FOUND., STATE RETIREE HEALTH PLAN 
SPENDING 10–12 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/09/
state_retiree_health_plan_spending.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT]. 
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TABLE 1: Selected Provisions Showing Range of Retiree Healthcare 
Benefits 
Plan Name Summary of Benefits 
Alabama State 
Employees 
Health 
Insurance Plan 
Continued coverage under existing plans for active 
employees is available both for retirees who have not 
reached the age of 65 and for those eligible for Medicare. 
Employees retiring after 25 years of service receive the full 
amount of the state share premium. For each year less than 
25, the state share is reduced by 4% and the retiree’s share 
is increased accordingly.25 
Arizona State 
Retirement 
System—Health 
Benefit Fund 
The system offers a “health insurance premium benefit to 
supplement the cost of retiree health insurance.” Retirees 
who have five or more years of credited service are eligible 
for a monthly premium benefit, which ranges from $75 to 
$260 per month, depending upon years of service and 
coverage selected.26 
California 
Employers’ 
Retiree Benefit 
Trust 
The health plans available to retired state employees are the 
same plans available to active employees, including 
supplemental plans for retirees enrolled in Medicare. For 
most retirees, the state pays 100% of the average premium 
cost for the retiree and 90% of the average additional costs 
for his or her dependents. Retired state employees are 
eligible to receive this contribution after 20 years of service. 
Retired employees with 10 years of state service receive 
50% of this amount, increasing 5% annually until the 100% 
level is earned.27 
Iowa Post-
retirement 
Medical Benefits 
The state permits retirees to enroll in the plans available to 
active employees. However, retirees must pay the entire 
health insurance premium.28  
                                                                                                            
 25. STATE EMPS. INS. BD., STATE OF ALABAMA, THE STATE EMPLOYEES’ HEALTH 
INSURANCE PLAN 14 (2018), https://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/SEHIPHandbook.pdf. 
 26. Retiree Health Insurance Premium Benefit and Optional Health Insurance 
Premium Benefit Programs, ARIZ. STATE RET. SYS., https://www.azasrs.gov/content/retiree-
health-insurance-premium-benefit-and-optional-health-insurance-premium-benefit (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 27. MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFF., THE 2015–16 BUDGET: 
HEALTH BENEFITS FOR RETIRED STATE EMPLOYEES 7–8 (2015), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/budget/retiree-health/retiree-health-benefits-
031615.pdf. 
 28. IOWA DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2017, at 120 (2017), 
https://das.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/acct_sae/cafr/fy17_cafr.pdf; Retirees, IOWA DEP’T OF 
ADMIN. SERVS., https://das.iowa.gov/human-resources/employee-and-retiree-
benefits/retirees-0 (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
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The variation has also extended to the organization and governance of 
retiree healthcare plans. Among plans administered at the state level, for example, 
some cover only state employees (or even specific groups such as judges and 
legislators), while others cover both state and local government employees.29 Some 
retiree healthcare plans are administered by state pension systems, while others are 
administered by departments of administration, health departments, or similar state 
agencies.30 In certain cases, new systems have been created to manage retiree 
healthcare benefits.31 Among plans that cover more than one employer, some have 
maintained individual accounts to track each employer’s assets and liabilities (even 
if assets are pooled for investment purposes) while other so-called cost-sharing plans 
have pooled the assets and liabilities of all the participating employers.32 
                                                                                                            
 29. In Alabama, for example, the State Employees’ Health Insurance Plan covers 
only state government employees and retirees, while the Public Education Employees’ Health 
Insurance Fund is a health insurance plan for active and retired employees of state and local 
educational institutions. THOMAS L. WHITE JR., OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, STATE 
OF ALABAMA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2014, at 118–27 (2014), 
http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2014.Alabama.pdf [hereinafter AL 2014 
CAFR]. 
 30. The California Public Employees Retirement System, for example, 
administers the California Employers’ Retiree Benefit Trust Fund for state employees and 
employees of participating local employers. CA. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, at 45 (2014), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-2014.pdf [hereinafter CALPERS 
2014 CAFR]. In Indiana, the State Personnel Department administers the State Personnel Plan 
for retired state employees. SUZANNE CROUCH, IND. AUDITOR OF STATE, STATE OF INDIANA, 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, at 112 
(2014), http://www.in.gov/auditor/files/Entire_2014_CAFR.pdf. 
 31. In Alabama, for example, the State Employees’ Insurance Board is a state 
agency established by the Alabama Legislature to administer the State Employees’ Health 
Insurance Plan. The Board’s members include the five members of the State Personnel Board, 
the Director of Finance, the Secretary–Treasurer of the Employees’ Retirement System of 
Alabama, two elected active employees of the state, and two elected retirees covered under 
the Plan. See The State Employees’ Health Insurance Plan FAQs, ALA. STATE EMPLOYEE’S 
INS. BD., http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/FAQ/SEHIPFAQ-AboutSEHIPPlan.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). Rhode Island set up a separate retiree healthcare system in 2010. 36 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-12.1-5 (West 2015) (“An OPEB System is hereby established and 
placed under the management of the OPEB Board for the purpose of providing and 
administering OPEB Benefits for Retired Employees of the State of Rhode Island and their 
dependents . . . .”). 
 32. For example, the California Employers’ Retiree Benefit Trust Fund is an agent 
multiple-employer plan with 427 employers. See CALPERS 2014 CAFR, supra note 30, at 
31. The Alabama Retired Education Employees’ Health Care Trust is a multiple-employer, 
cost-sharing, defined benefit healthcare plan with 197 participating employers. See AL 2014 
CAFR, supra note 29, at 127. 
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B. The Legal Status of Healthcare Promises 
For any given set of benefits, the two critical questions are as follows: first, 
what is the legal status of the benefits in place, and second, how will such benefits 
be funded? The following sections tackle each issue in turn. 
Consider an individual who commences work for a state agency. The 
public employer sponsors a retiree healthcare plan alongside a traditional pension 
plan for its employees. The pension plan provides a monthly pension benefit at 
retirement roughly equal to 2% of the employee’s salary multiplied by the number 
of years worked.33 Although employees accrue benefits for each year worked, 
benefits do not vest until the employees complete five years of service. If employees 
terminate employment before completing five years of service, they are not entitled 
to any pension benefits. After five years of service, our hypothetical employee 
would have a vested pension benefit equal to 10% of the employee’s salary. The 
benefits continue to accrue for each additional year of service. After 20 years of 
service, the same employee would have a pension benefit equal to 40% (2%*20 
years) of the employee’s salary. 
The retiree healthcare plan covers a portion of the employee’s health-
insurance premiums in retirement. Each year, the state sets the monthly dollar 
amount of the employer contribution for active employees (for example, $700 for 
an individual plan in 2017). The proportion of that contribution to which employees 
are entitled in retirement depends on their years of service. Until employees 
complete ten years of service, they are not eligible for any retiree healthcare benefits. 
After ten years of service, an employee is entitled to 50% of the contribution upon 
retirement from the public employer. With each additional year, the contribution 
increases by 5%, reaching 100% after 20 years of service. Thus, an employee who 
retires from the public agency with 20 years of service would be eligible to receive 
the full employer contribution each month to offset the costs of health-insurance 
premiums in retirement. 
Assuming both the pension and retiree healthcare benefits as described are 
in place when the employee commences employment on Day 1, can the employer 
choose to eliminate the benefits on Day 2? After the employee has completed ten 
years of service? After the employee has retired? 
To sum up in one sentence, although there is significant state-by-state 
variation, employers generally have greater latitude to modify healthcare benefits 
than pension benefits. The following paragraphs describe the historical path to this 
result and the current framework for evaluating the legal status of retiree healthcare 
benefits. 
Public-sector pension benefits were once considered “gratuities” that, in 
the words of one court, sprang “from the graciousness and appreciation of 
sovereignty” and that could be “given or withheld at the pleasure of a sovereign 
                                                                                                            
 33. The final calculation of the pension benefit may use the employee’s average 
salary over the years of service or over the final few years. 
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power.”34 By the mid-twentieth century, however, nearly every state had moved 
away from the gratuity approach, with most state courts adopting the position that 
public pension plans create “some type of contractual relationship between the state 
and the employee.”35 In some states, constitutional provisions now explicitly specify 
that public pension plans create contracts between the state and the plan participants. 
In other states, courts have found contractual arrangements in the statutory 
provisions that govern public pension systems. States differ on the application and 
bounds of the contractual approach, but the notion that state pension programs 
establish contracts with employees, that the benefits vest after some period, and that 
states are not free to reduce benefits that have already accrued has been firmly 
established.36 
For pension plans in the private sector, Congress went a step further. In 
enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 
Congress mandated accrual, vesting, and funding requirements for all employer-
sponsored pension plans, thus restricting employers’ ability to reduce accrued 
benefits and mandating that such benefits be funded as they are earned. The 
approach reflected a determination that, as a matter of public policy, the accrual, 
vesting, and funding of pension benefits should not be left to contracts between 
individual employers and employees.37 
Neither Congress nor the states have extended the same kind of accrual, 
vesting, or funding requirements to retiree healthcare benefits.38 The historical 
                                                                                                            
 34. Eddy v. Morgan, 75 N.E. 174, 178 (Ill. 1905). 
 35. Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its 
Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1035 (2012). In a smaller subset of 
states, courts have held that pension benefits create a property right subject to due-process 
requirements. Two states continue to apply the gratuity framework in limited circumstances. 
See JENNIE HERRIOT-HATFIELD ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE TO STATE PENSION REFORM 1–2 
(2012), http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Legal/PensionLegalGuide 
_RELEASE.pdf. 
 36. Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 618–19 (2010). 
 37. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty”, 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 449 (1993) (observing that there may be 
“something especially difficult about the contract specification and monitoring costs of 
employee pensions that necessitates the federal regulatory framework of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974”). Scholars have long recognized the “imbalance in 
power between management and workers in real world markets,” a dynamic that is only 
amplified when the subject of negotiation is a complex, decades-long financial arrangement 
laden with uncertainty about long-term costs. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Regulating 
Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257, 1297–1302 (2016); see also Catherine 
L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common 
Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 160 (1995) (arguing that “classical contract 
doctrine is ill-suited for the task of identifying and resolving conflicts between the 
expectations of parties to an employee benefits relationship”). 
 38. See Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, at lxxxv, 
lxxxviii–xciii (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (“The answer as to why ERISA didn’t 
do more respecting health and other welfare plans is quite simple: Unlike pension plans, there 
was no crisis in health plans in 1974. No one was complaining about the loss of health benefits 
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justification for the distinction points to the low—even de minimis—costs of retiree 
healthcare some four decades ago and thus the lack of political interest in regulating 
such benefits.39 But now that the cost argument no longer applies, does the 
distinction hold up from a theoretical perspective? After all, both pension and retiree 
healthcare benefits provide something of monetary value in retirement as a form of 
deferred compensation for the employee’s service.40 A key distinction cited to 
justify the disparate legal status of pension and healthcare benefits is the difficulty 
in measuring accrual rates for the latter. That is, because pension benefits are 
typically calculated as a percentage of salary multiplied by the number of years 
worked, it is relatively straightforward to determine the accrued and vested benefits 
in a given year. For example, the hypothetical employee described above accrues 
pension benefits at the rate of 2% of salary in each year, with full vesting after five 
years. Of course, since the employee’s lifespan is not known, the total value of the 
benefits over an employee’s lifetime remains uncertain.41 
In the case of healthcare benefits, the form of the benefits traditionally 
chosen by most public employers is not as amenable to calculation of yearly 
accruals. In many cases, the benefits are intentionally structured as all-or-nothing. 
That is, an employee may be eligible to receive certain benefits upon retiring with 
at least ten years of service, but nothing if the employee retires even a day before 
completing the ten years of service or terminates employment before retirement age. 
While the all-or-nothing formulation with respect to years of service commonly 
characterizes pension benefits (that is, the pension benefits vest only after an 
employee works for an employer for a specified number of years), the conditioning 
of benefits on retiring from the employer is a distinguishing feature of retiree 
healthcare plans. 
 Further, although some retiree healthcare plans have recently taken the 
form of defined-dollar subsidies that provide post-retirement income,42 traditionally 
                                                                                                            
as they were about pensions.”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Labor & Benefits Law 
Professors in Support of Respondents, supra note 16 (noting that retiree health insurance 
during the 1960s and 1970s “was inexpensive; indeed, some employers considered the cost 
of these benefits to be de minimis”). 
 39. See, e.g., LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 910 (noting that although retiree 
health plans differ from the “garden variety welfare benefit plan,” because such plans are not 
treated as pension plans under ERISA, the statute’s vesting and funding rules do not apply). 
 40. David A. Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health Benefits, 3 
SUFFOLK U. J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 103, 113 (2007) (“[A] plan that provides health 
benefits across a worker’s retirement period functions as a type of pension plan, a pension 
plan that pays in specie rather than in dollars . . . .”). In M&G Polymers USA, LCC v. Tackett, 
135 S. Ct. 926, 936 (2015), however, the Supreme Court emphasized that under ERISA, 
Congress specifically defined those plans that “resul[t] in a deferral of income by employees” 
as pension plans, and those that provide for medical benefits, as welfare plans. The Court 
interpreted the definitions to suggest that plans that provide medical benefits in retirement do 
not result in the deferral of income.  
 41. Pension benefits are also commonly subject to cost-of-living adjustments, 
which add uncertainty to the ultimate “price tag” for the benefits. 
 42. PEW REPORT, supra note 24, at 11 (citing 12 states that structure retiree 
healthcare plans in this way). Notably, in its guidance, GASB distinguishes between retiree 
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such benefits have been structured to provide retirees a percentage of the employer 
contribution for active employees in any given year. In the latter case, the cost of 
such benefits has been contingent not only on the lifespan of a retiree, but also on 
healthcare costs at a particular point in time. The pervasive argument has been that 
retiree healthcare benefits “do not accrue throughout an employee’s career and 
cannot, in any meaningful sense, be valued over time.”43 Accordingly, retiree 
healthcare has long been considered a “status benefit,” such that an employee 
becomes entitled to the benefit—i.e., that the benefit accrues—only after attaining 
the requisite retiree status.44 
Can the employer, therefore, take away the retiree healthcare benefits a day 
before the employee retires? One day after? At what point, if any, does the benefit 
become a vested right? At present, the ability of a public employer to modify retiree 
healthcare benefits for employees or retirees depends on the highly idiosyncratic 
combination of applicable statutory provisions, collective-bargaining terms, and 
case law in a particular jurisdiction.45 In each case, the challenge is to determine 
whether the arrangement at hand constitutes a contractual obligation of the state.46 
Consequently, the status of retiree healthcare benefits can vary widely from case to 
case. In 2015, for example, a California appellate court held that after the 
memorandum of understanding between the City of South Pasadena and its police 
union expired, the city was permitted to unilaterally reduce its medical insurance 
contribution for retirees.47 Two years earlier, however, a California superior court 
                                                                                                            
health plans that provide for unrestricted income in retirement and those that provide income 
that may only be used for certain healthcare-related expenses. GASB considers the former to 
be a pension and not a retiree healthcare plan. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF GASB STATEMENTS 43 AND 45 ON OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 5 (2005) (“The use of the health insurance subsidy 
provided as an additional monthly cash payment to retirees and beneficiaries is effectively 
not restricted to payment of health insurance and, therefore, the subsidy should be considered 
retirement income.”). 
 43. AMY B. MONAHAN, INVIOLABLE—OR NOT: THE LEGAL STATUS OF RETIREE 
MEDICAL BENEFITS FOR STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES 7 (2016). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., John R. Dorocak & James Estes, State and Local Government 
Funding of Health and Retirement Benefits for Employees: Current Problems and Possible 
Solutions with California Health Benefits as an Example, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 321–23 
(2012); Moran, supra note 7, at 701–15; Sanchez, supra note 7, at 1181–83. 
 46. Although the legal status of retiree healthcare benefits is far from uniform, the 
variation is commonly overlooked. See, e.g., EILEEN NORCROSS & OLIVIA GONZALEZ, 
RANKING THE STATES BY FISCAL CONDITION 23 (2016), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Norcross-Fiscal-Rankings-2-v3_1.pdf (stating that 
retiree healthcare benefits “do not carry the same legal protection as pensions and represent a 
liability that may be impaired, reduced, or eliminated”). 
 47. S. Pasadena Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of S. Pasadena, No. B254176, 2015 
WL 1094691, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015). The court found that the case lacked 
“unmistakable evidence . . . evince[ing] a legislative intent to create [implied] private rights 
of a contractual nature enforceable against’ the City” and emphasized that employee 
“assumption[s]” that a benefit will continue do not create implied agreements. Id. (quoting 
another source). 
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held that a Los Angeles city ordinance freezing the retiree health-insurance-
premium subsidy or requiring current employees to contribute additional amounts 
constituted an illegal impairment of a right that had vested upon the acceptance of 
employment.48 
Courts assess the legal protections available in a particular jurisdiction by 
first considering any applicable constitutional protections for retiree healthcare 
benefits. Several state constitutions explicitly prohibit the impairment of “accrued 
benefits,” but state courts have disagreed as to whether such “accrued benefits” 
encompass retiree healthcare and other non-pension, post-employment benefits. For 
example, while the non-impairment clause in Michigan has been interpreted to 
exclude retiree healthcare benefits, similar clauses in Alaska, Hawaii, and Illinois 
have been extended to retiree health obligations.49 The Supreme Court of Alaska 
held that the term accrued benefits in the Alaska Constitution includes “all 
retirement benefits that make up the retirement benefit package that becomes part of 
the contract of employment when the public employee is hired.”50 
After considering any relevant constitutional provisions, the next step is to 
consider the extent to which the applicable state statutes or ordinances create a 
contractual obligation with respect to the provision of retiree healthcare.51 Because 
                                                                                                            
 48. L.A. City Attorney’s Ass’n v. City of L.A., No. BS135294, at *11 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct. Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.lacaa.org/docs/13-09-13-order-granting-writ.pdf. That same 
year, a federal district court found that where a county board of supervisors consistently 
ordered—via annual approval of a resolution—health and dental insurance subsidies to be 
paid to retirees, the conduct did not establish intent to promise a benefit in perpetuity. 
Sacramento Cty. Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Cty. of Sacramento, 975 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 
(E.D. Cal. 2013). Thus, the board was permitted to reduce the health benefits provided to 
retirees. See id. 
 49. Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Grp. Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of 
Trustees v. City of Pontiac No. 2, 873 N.W.2d 783, 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that 
healthcare benefits are not “accrued financial benefits,” for purposes of the state’s 
constitutional prohibition on diminishing or impairing accrued financial benefits of pension 
plans and retirement systems). Article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution provides that 
“[m]embership in employee retirement systems of the State of its political subdivisions shall 
constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be 
diminished or impaired.” ALASKA CONST., art. XII, § 7. The Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that “accrued benefits” include retiree health benefits. Duncan v. Retired Public Employees 
of Alaska, 71 P.3d 882, 887 (Alaska 2003). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that health- 
insurance subsidies for state retirees that flowed directly from membership in one of the 
state’s public pension systems were constitutionally protected by the state’s pension 
protection clause. See Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228, 1240 (Ill. 2014); see also 
Underwood v. City of Chicago, 62 N.E.3d 375, 382–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). Hawaii’s 
Supreme Court similarly held in 2010 that retiree health benefits provided by the health 
benefits plan for state retirees were an “accrued benefit” arising from membership in an 
employee retirement system of the State and thus were protected by the Non-Impairment 
Clause of the Hawaii State Constitution. Everson v. State, 228 P.3d 282, 295 (Haw. 2010). 
 50. Duncan, 71 P.3d at 888 (emphasis added). 
 51. Massachusetts state law, for example, provides that changes to healthcare plan 
design and contribution rates for current employees must be accomplished through the 
collective-bargaining process. However, municipalities have the authority to change retiree 
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finding that such a contract exists has the effect of binding future legislatures, the 
burden on the claimant is to show “unmistakable evidence of legislative intent to 
form a contract.”52 Barring such unmistakable intent to restrict the authority of future 
legislatures, statutes providing healthcare benefits to retirees generally have not been 
held to create contractual obligations for state and local governments.53 
If neither the state constitution nor the applicable statutory provisions 
establish contractual obligations to provide retiree healthcare benefits, such 
obligations may arise from so-called implied contracts and from employer conduct 
that induces reasonable employee reliance on the employer’s promises.54 In both 
types of cases, the absence of an express agreement shifts the focus of judicial 
review to the employer’s actions and the extent to which such actions—as either a 
matter of quasi-contract or on promissory estoppel grounds—create binding 
obligations.55 In the promissory estoppel cases, the reasonableness of the 
employees’ reliance on the employer’s conduct is also assessed, which, in the 
context of retiree healthcare benefits, requires a court to determine whether it was 
reasonable for employees to expect retiree healthcare promises to create long-term, 
binding obligations on the employer.56 
Finally, in cases where retiree healthcare benefits are provided through a 
collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”), the legal status of such benefits is 
controlled by the terms of the agreement.57 In many cases, however, such CBAs are 
                                                                                                            
healthcare insurance benefits unilaterally so long as the benefits meet the minimum standards 
set by the Commonwealth. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32B, § 9A (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 175 of 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Emp’t 
Relations Bd., 24 N.E.3d 552, 558 (Mass. 2015). 
 52. MONAHAN, supra note 43, at 9. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Retired Emp. Ass’n of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange, 266 P.3d 
287, 301 (Cal. 2011) (holding that under California law, a vested right to health benefits for 
retired county employees can be implied under certain circumstances from a county ordinance 
or resolution); see also Andrews, Jr. v. Lombardi, No. KC20131128, 2017 WL 532353, at 
*34 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2017) (finding “the necessary offer, acceptance, and consideration 
to form an implied-in-fact contract from the relations of and communications” between 
certain retirees and the City of Providence where “the promise of healthcare benefits was part 
of the post-retirement benefits package that the City offered to Plaintiffs in exchange for 
diligent and continuous employment in their dangerous jobs as firefighters and police 
officers” and “[p]laintiffs accepted and performed their end of the bargained-for exchange 
through continued and faithful service to the City”). 
 55. Promissory estoppel requires finding that the employer’s retiree healthcare 
promises could have been expected to, and in fact did, reasonably induce employee action, 
and that upholding the promise is the only means of avoiding injustice and unfairness. See, 
e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 43, at 9–10. 
 56. See, e.g., Allen v. Bd. of Educ. of the Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 20, 168 A.D.2d 
403, 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 57. In general, not all states provide collective-bargaining rights to public 
employees. U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-835, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF WORKERS WITH AND WITHOUT BARGAINING RIGHTS 
8–9 (2002) (observing that 26 states have laws “that provide collective bargaining rights to 
essentially all public employees,” while “12 states essentially do not have any laws for 
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silent or ambiguous—often intentionally so—as to the duration of the retiree 
healthcare benefits provided in the agreement.58 CBAs commonly include language 
promising “lifetime” health benefits, while simultaneously limiting the duration of 
the CBA or preserving the employer’s right to alter or terminate benefits.59 Judicial 
approaches to the interpretation of such contracts differ across jurisdictions. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, has applied a presumption in favor of 
vesting post-employment healthcare benefits, which the court found to be a form of 
deferred compensation for past services rendered.60 Conversely, the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee has declined to apply such a presumption, holding instead that retiree 
                                                                                                            
collective bargaining among state and local employees,” and the remaining “12 states have 
laws that provide bargaining rights to specific groups of workers.”). Further, recent years have 
witnessed the decline of and recent restrictions on public-sector unions. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members–2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01262017.pdf (noting declines in union 
membership); Unions Decline in Public Sector, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014 at B2; Clay 
Masters, Iowa Moves to Restrict Collective Bargaining for Public Sector Workers, NPR 
(Feb. 14, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/14/515242288/iowa-moves-to-
restrict-collective-bargaining-for-public-sector-workers; see also Maria O’Brien Hylton, 
Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private Ordering of Wages and Benefits in the Public 
Sector, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 177, 183 (2016) (analyzing the consequences of the 2011 
Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, which “largely eliminated collective bargaining for state 
public employees”). 
 58. Maria O’Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-
Employment Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2016) (documenting how private- 
sector employers and unions “came to the same strategic conclusion . . . that silence was 
preferable to an explicit commitment.”); see also Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court’s 
Application of ‘Ordinary Contract Principles’ to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree 
Healthcare Benefits: Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. (forthcoming) (reporting, based on interviews, that “union and management lawyers 
familiar with collective bargaining, particularly on vesting of healthcare benefits, concede 
they are willing to live with uncertainty because of the dangers of even raising the issue during 
bargaining”). An analysis of 50 public-sector CBAs available in the online database 
maintained by the Office of Labor-Management Standards of the U.S. Department of Labor, 
as of 2014, revealed that 22% of the CBAs included the ambiguous phrase that benefits “will 
continue,” but did not specify a period of duration or conditions associated with that 
continuance; meanwhile 18% were completely silent on the question of vesting. Brief of 
Goldstein & Russell, P.C., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3, M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010), 2014 WL 3687262, at *3. 
 59. Notably, even where current employees are represented by unions, such unions 
do not generally represent or consider the interests of retirees. The interests of retirees may 
not align with the interests of current employees, and union involvement in the (re)negotiation 
of post-employment benefits is fraught with potential conflicts among union members. See, 
e.g., Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Wis. 2000) (expressing concern that 
retirees may be “voiceless” in such negotiations and that “unions that are negotiating on 
behalf of current employees may unilaterally bargain away contractual promises made to 
retirees, thereby frustrating the expectations of employees who have earned retirement 
benefits by providing past services”). 
 60. Id. (noting in support of the presumption of vesting that because unions do not 
represent retirees, they may bargain for greater benefits for active employees at the expense 
of benefits for retirees). 
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healthcare benefits will not vest unless there is express language—through terms 
such as lifetime benefits, vested rights, or contractual obligation—documenting the 
parties’ intent to do so.61 As is quite common in cases adjudicating the retiree 
healthcare benefits of public-sector employees, the Tennessee court looked to the 
private sector for guidance.62 
The consideration of case law from the private sector reflects the broad 
similarities in the public- and private-sector legal frameworks for retiree healthcare 
benefits. As in the public sector, retiree healthcare benefits in the private sector are 
protected only to the extent of any contractual agreement with the employer.63 In 
2015, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split as to the presumptions used to 
interpret ambiguous terms in private-sector CBAs. In M&G Polymers v. Tackett, the 
employer had entered into a CBA that promised that union employees who reached 
a certain age and years of service would receive a full company contribution for 
healthcare benefits in retirement. The benefits were to be provided for the duration 
of the agreement. The CBA was subject to renegotiation after three years. After the 
CBA expired, the employer decided that retirees had to begin contributing toward 
the cost of their health insurance. The retirees challenged the employer decision, 
alleging that they had a vested right to lifetime contribution-free healthcare benefits. 
                                                                                                            
 61. Davis v. Wilson Cty., 70 S.W.3d 724, 725, 727–28 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that 
“health care benefits were welfare benefits that did not vest automatically and that there was 
no clear and express language in the resolutions that the health care benefits were intended to 
vest or could not be terminated”). Other courts have declined to apply a presumption in either 
favor. See, e.g., Poole v. City of Waterbury, 831 A.2d 211, 224 (Conn. 2003) (applying “well-
established principles of contract interpretation” to address the issue of vesting). 
 62. See Davis, 70 S.W.3d at 727. 
 63. Barring contrary provisions in CBAs, private-sector employers may eliminate 
retiree healthcare benefits at any time. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 
U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (“Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for 
any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans”); see also MONAHAN, 
supra note 43, at 7–8. Notably, however, ERISA does subject retiree-healthcare-plan 
administrators to certain fiduciary obligations. Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an 
Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 391 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
391, 406 (1999) (discussing the fiduciary regime that applies to non-pension benefits plans 
under ERISA). Accordingly, in the private sector, plan participants have alleged the plan 
administrators breached their fiduciary obligations by representing to plan participants that 
the employer could not modify retiree health benefits. See, e.g., Gregg v. Transp. Workers of 
Am. Int’l, 343 F.3d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty where an 
employer told employees that benefits “can be continued indefinitely after retirement at the 
same monthly rate” and that the rate might “go up a few cents” when the employer in fact 
retained the right to change the plan); James v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 
455–56 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty where the defendant informed 
employees that their benefits would not be changed during their lifetimes when the defendant 
retained the right to change the benefits); Hatmaker v. Consol. Nuclear Sec., LLC, No. 3:15-
cv-351-TAV-HBG, 2016 WL 8711457 at *6–8 (E.D. Tenn. May 9, 2016) (holding that the 
proposed class of retirees stated a valid fiduciary breach claim based on the employer’s 
alleged misrepresentations about the security of retiree health benefits). 
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The absence of explicit provisions to address the vesting of healthcare benefits, 
while quite common in such agreements,64 baffled some on the Court.65 
In a unanimous decision, the Justices held that “when a contract is silent as 
to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended 
those benefits to vest for life.”66 Instead, ordinary contract-law principles apply, 
including the principle that contractual obligations generally cease upon the 
termination of the CBA. In cases where a contract is found to be ambiguous, the 
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of the parties.67 
Justice Ginsburg noted in a concurrence that, for purposes of determining whether 
the contract provides for the vesting of retiree healthcare benefits, clear and express 
language is not required.68 Instead, both explicit and implied terms of an agreement 
                                                                                                            
 64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 65. During oral arguments, Justice Scalia expressed great surprise about the failure 
of a private-sector employer and an employee union to address the vesting of retiree 
healthcare benefits in the CBA: 
You know, the nice thing about a contract case of this sort is you can’t feel 
bad about it. Whoever loses deserves to lose. (Laughter.) I mean, this thing 
is obviously an important feature. Both sides knew it [the issue of vesting] 
was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses deserves to lose for 
casting this upon us when it could have been said very clearly in the 
contract. Such an important feature. So I hope we’ll get it right, but, you 
know, I can’t feel bad about it.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 
S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010). 
 66. M&G Polymers USA, LCC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 937 (2015). 
 67. Id. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. In the 2015–2018 period, several decisions relied on this argument, with 
courts refusing to accept the employers’ claims that the absence of specific language 
providing for lifetime healthcare doomed retirees’ claims. See, e.g., Tackett v. M&G 
Polymers USA, LLC, 811 F.3d 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit stated:   
Thus, while the Supreme Court’s decision [in Tackett] prevents us from 
presuming that absent specific durational language referring to retiree 
benefits themselves, a general durational clause says nothing about the 
vesting of retiree benefits, we also cannot presume that the absence of 
such specific language, by itself, evidences an intent not to vest benefits 
or that a general durational clause says everything about the intent to vest. 
 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877, 882 (6th 
Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018). The court in Reese held that 
[t]o find ambiguity in this case, partially from the silence as to the parties’ 
intentions, does not offend the Supreme Court’s mandate from Tackett that 
we not infer vesting from silence. There is surely a difference between 
finding ambiguity from silence and finding vesting from silence. The latter 
is impermissible after Tackett; the former permits the court to turn to 
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties—precisely the 
goal in any contract dispute. 
Id.; Fletcher v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (finding that 
a “clear statement” that the company agreed to provide lifetime retiree healthcare benefits is 
not necessarily required to establish vesting). In February of 2018, the Supreme Court issued 
a per curiam opinion finding that the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Reese, which the Supreme 
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could evidence such intent. The Court’s elimination of the presumption in favor of 
vesting—long espoused by the Sixth Circuit—has been described as a kind of 
“lifeline” to those employers seeking to amend benefits.69 Numerous such 
amendments have followed, and since the decision was handed down in 2015, 
Tackett has already been cited in several cases concerning public-sector benefits.70 
                                                                                                            
Court characterized as using “Yard-Man inferences . . . to render a collective-bargaining 
agreement ambiguous as a matter of law, thus allowing courts to consult extrinsic evidence 
about lifetime vesting” could not be squared with the Supreme Court holding in Tackett. CNH 
Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018) (per curiam). Specifically, the Court rejected 
the lower court’s finding of ambiguity, again reiterating that “a contract is not ambiguous 
unless it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and the Yard-Man inferences 
cannot generate a reasonable interpretation because they are not ‘ordinary principles of 
contract law.’” Id. (quoting M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 937 
(2015)).  
 69. Robert C. Pozen & Ronald J. Gilson, Debt-Saddled Municipal Budgets Get a 
Lifeline, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2015, at A13; see also Gilbert Brosky, Ding-Dong, Yard-Man 
Is Dead! Supreme Court Decision in Tackett a Huge Win for Employers in the Retiree 
Healthcare Arena, EMP. CLASS ACTION BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.employmentclassactionreport.com/benefits/ding-dong-yard-man-is-dead-
supreme-court-decision-in-tackett-a-huge-win-for-employers-in-the-retiree-healthcare-
arena/; Robert Pozen, Renegotiating Retiree Health Care Plans After New Supreme Court 
Guidance, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 7, 2015), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/07/renegotiating-retiree-health-care-plans-after-new-
supreme-court-guidance/. 
 70. See, e.g., S. Pasadena Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of S. Pasadena, No. 
B254176, 2015 WL 1094691, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Tackett for the proposition 
that “when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that 
the parties intended those benefits to vest for life”); Harper Woods Retirees Ass’n v. City of 
Harper Woods, 879 N.W.2d 897, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that “that the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tackett is consistent with Michigan’s contract jurisprudence 
regarding CBAs, which applies with equal force in both the public and private sectors” in this 
regard); Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Grp. Health & Ins. Tr. Bd. of Trustees v. 
City of Pontiac No. 2, 873 N.W.2d 783, 791 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Tackett for the 
proposition that because the “retirees’ rights to healthcare benefits flow from the pertinent 
CBAs, they are governed by ordinary contract principles”); Vallejo Police Officers Ass’n v. 
City of Vallejo, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 291 n.9 (Ct. App. 2017) (noting that Tackett “says 
nothing to prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent”). Some 
judges, however, have vigorously rejected the application of Tackett to public-sector benefits. 
See, e.g., Matthews v. Chicago Transit Auth., 51 N.E. 3d 753, 784 (Ill. 2016) (Theis, J., 
concurring) The Court in Matthews opined that 
Tackett and its progeny . . . would control our analysis, if this dispute arose 
under the Labor Management Relations Act . . . and ERISA. It did not. 
Therefore, those cases are inapposite . . . nothing about Tackett’s holding 
is “critical” to resolving the issue in this case because federal law does not 
govern the interpretation of CBAs with state and local governments . . . . 
Here, the plaintiffs’ employer was a municipal entity and the interpretation 
of the 2004 CBA rests, not on federal law, but on Illinois law. 
Id. 
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Legislative efforts to require a presumption in favor of vesting absent clear and 
convincing language to the contrary have not been successful.71 
In sum, the provision of retiree healthcare benefits today entails complex, 
decades-long financial arrangements laden with uncertainty about long-term costs. 
Public employers and employees rarely address directly the thorniest terms of such 
arrangements. As a result, the parties to the arrangements—including individual 
employees and retirees—must assess whether the particular combination of 
statutory provisions, collective-bargaining terms, and employer conduct would be 
deemed by a court to create a binding obligation on the employer. 
C. The Great GASB and the Shift from Pay-As-You-Go to Prefunding 
The lack of legal certainty as to employers’ ability to reduce or eliminate 
retiree healthcare benefits has necessarily shaped funding policies. Traditionally, 
retiree healthcare benefits have been funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, whereby 
public employers covered in each year the cost of benefits only for current retirees. 
Critically, employers did not aside any assets for the benefits promised to and earned 
by current employees. 
The pay-as-you-go approach to funding has made it easy for most state and 
local governments to promise their employees relatively generous benefits in 
retirement. Promising such benefits has served as a valuable recruiting tool and one 
that had no impact on the employers’ balance sheets. The costs were reflected only 
in the income statements when the benefits were ultimately paid to the retirees, 
typically decades after the promises for such benefits were made. Accordingly, 
many state and local governments did not measure the value of the retiree healthcare 
promises that had been made to public employees, nor did they consider how such 
promises would affect budgets beyond the short term.72 Indeed, many were surprised 
by the magnitude of the total accrued liabilities. In the case of Detroit, for example, 
the City’s bankruptcy filings revealed unfunded retiree healthcare obligations 
totaling $6.4 billion, as compared to $3 billion in unfunded liabilities for pension 
benefits.73 
The pay-as-you-go approach persisted for nearly five decades. Year after 
year, state and local governments contributed and reported only the amounts paid 
on behalf of current retirees. The practice persisted in the public sector even as the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) imposed accrual-based 
                                                                                                            
 71. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Fairness and Employee Benefits Protection Act, S. 2418, 
113th Cong. (2014). The proposed legislation would have also required employers to provide 
specific information to employees about the duration of their retiree healthcare benefits. 
 72. DAVID ZION & AMIT VARSHNEY, CREDIT SUISSE, YOU DROPPED A BOMB ON 
ME, GASB 6–7 (2007), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/DroppedB.pdf 
(describing the $1.5 trillion in “hidden” retiree healthcare liabilities for state and local 
governments). Then New Jersey Governor Corzine remarked in 2007 that “[t]he constant 
focus on short-term priorities without consideration of long-term costs has led to financial 
decisions that hang over the state today, tomorrow, and far into the future.” Id. at 16. 
 73. See Robert C. Pozen, The Retirement Surprise in Detroit’s Bankruptcy, 
BROOKINGS (July 25, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-retirement-surprise-in-
detroits-bankruptcy/. 
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accounting on private-sector retiree healthcare benefits in 1992.74 More than a 
decade after the changes in the private sector went into effect, GASB—the private, 
not-for-profit organization responsible for accounting and financial reporting 
standards for state and local governments—followed with similar changes to public-
sector benefits.75 
In its 2004 pronouncement (“GASB Standard No. 45”), GASB declared 
that retiree healthcare and other non-pension, post-employment benefits constitute 
a form of deferred employee compensation that should be recognized in the year in 
which the employee performs services for the employer. GASB noted further that 
“the employer has a constructive, if not legal, obligation for promised benefits to the 
extent the benefits are attributable to services already received and it is probable that 
conditions for an employee’s eligibility to receive benefits will be met.”76 Following 
through on its logic, GASB then extended its previously adopted standards for 
pension plans to state and local government retiree healthcare plans. In a dramatic 
shift for public employers, GASB Standard No. 45 required for the first time that 
employers with retiree healthcare plans disclose the following: (1) the value of the 
benefits already earned and those expected to be earned by employees in the future; 
(2) the value of any assets set aside to cover such benefits; and (3) the difference 
between the two categories. It also required public employers to calculate the annual 
required contribution (“ARC”)—defined as the amount a public employer would 
have to contribute annually to cover the cost of benefits accrued in that year and to 
pay off any accrued, unfunded liabilities in no more than 30 years—and to disclose 
the percentage of the ARC contributed in the reporting year.77 
By bringing to light—and to the attention of credit rating agencies, 
taxpayers, and legislators—the value of unfunded promises and the growing 
percentage of state and local government budgets needed to cover retiree healthcare 
benefits, the new rules created powerful incentives for state and local governments 
to mitigate the gap between the retiree healthcare assets and liabilities. To address 
the latter, states began to explore ways to reduce coverage for retirees.78 At the same 
                                                                                                            
 74. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 106: EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER 
THAN PENSIONS 5 (1990) [hereinafter FASB 106]. As many have observed, after FASB 106 
went into effect and the magnitude of the liabilities became clear, “private employers began 
a determined course of reducing the liabilities they owed by cutting retiree health benefits.” 
See, e.g., Moran, supra note 7, at 678; Sanchez, supra note 7, at 1161 (noting that “[i]n 1993, 
forty percent of private employers offered retiree health benefits; by 2001, only twenty-three 
percent did”). The private sector’s move to terminate, rather than prefund, retiree healthcare 
plans may have been driven in part by the limitations of the tax code, namely the absence of 
a structure that, in the context of pension benefits, allows contributions and earnings of 
pension funds to be tax deferred. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 912–13. 
 75. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT GASB 1 (2013–
2014), www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=1176163065939. 
 76. GASB 45, supra note 8, at 78. 
 77. Id. at 99.  
 78. MONAHAN, supra note 43, at 6 (“Many U.S. jurisdictions are currently 
exploring the possibility of reducing or eliminating retiree medical coverage . . . .”); see also 
infra Part III. 
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time, the GASB rules encouraged public employers to establish retiree healthcare 
trusts and to prefund retiree healthcare liabilities in the same way that they prefund 
pensions. Saving and investing current assets would allow public employers to take 
advantage of market returns.79 At the same time—and perhaps more importantly—
the new GASB rules offered immediate accounting benefits to public employers that 
set up retiree healthcare trusts. Such employers were permitted to use a higher 
discount rate to calculate the present value of accrued liabilities, which would 
immediately reduce the value of the unfunded liabilities that GASB now required 
public employers to report. As lawmakers quickly realized, from an accounting 
perspective, establishing a retiree healthcare trust and making even relatively small 
contributions to it would have immediate and substantial benefits.80 
Actuarial calculations prepared in 2015 by California’s Controller illustrate 
the effect of prefunding on the discount rate and on the liability calculation: with 
pay-as-you-go funding, the assumed discount rate is 4.25%, and the state’s 2015 
actuarial accrued liability for retiree healthcare benefits totals $74.19 billion. A plan 
to fully fund the retiree healthcare obligation over a 30-year period justifies a 
discount rate of 7.28% (the expected rate of return on the assets in the trust), and in 
turn, the state can report an actuarial accrued liability of just $48.5 billion (rather 
than $74.19 billion). As the Controller has underscored, in the long-run, prefunding 
just 10% of the total obligation ultimately takes $3.29 billion off of the state’s 
unfunded liability because of investment returns and compound interest.81 
II. THE RISE OF HEALTHCARE TRUSTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This Part considers the consequences of the GASB rules enacted in 2004. 
Some basic statistics point to striking developments. As Table 2 shows, by 2015, 35 
states had established at least one irrevocable retiree healthcare trust.82 Across all 
101 state-administered retiree healthcare plans, 66 plans had trusts. While the 
                                                                                                            
 79. The new disclosure requirements took effect just as the 2008 financial crisis 
began to strain the budgets of state and local governments. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, 
36 (“Unfunded [retiree healthcare] liabilities on their own are large enough to represent a 
fiscal pressure for state and local governments but are also likely to be considered part of the 
broader fiscal challenge of managing increasing health care costs. State and local 
governments faced increasing fiscal pressures in 2008, in part because of recession-induced 
revenue shortfalls.”). 
 80. In many cases, state actors have been explicit about the motivations for the 
retiree healthcare trusts. See, e.g., GEORGIA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2006 at 92 (2006), https://archive.org/stream/cafr-GA-
Georgia-2006/GA%20State%20of%20Georgia%202006_djvu.txt (“In response to the GASB 
Statements, the General Assembly has made statutory changes to create a trust fund, in which 
employer contributions for future retiree health costs may be accumulated and invested, and 
which is expected to facilitate the separate financial reporting of these benefits.”). 
 81. Press Release, California State Controller’s Office, State Controller Yee 
Updates Unfunded Retiree Health Care Liability (Jan. 26. 2016), 
http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_16936.html. 
 82. Almost all the trusts are governmental trusts established pursuant to IRC 
§ 115; a handful of plans have established § 401(h) health-benefit subaccounts or Voluntary 
Employees’ Beneficiary Associations. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
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median funding levels for retiree healthcare trusts remained just below 21%, some 
12 trusts had funding levels greater than 70%.83 Meanwhile, five trusts remained 
entirely unfunded. 
TABLE 2: Prevalence of Retiree Healthcare Trusts in the United States as of 2015 
States That Have at Least One Retiree 
Healthcare Trust 
States Without Retiree 
Healthcare Trusts84 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Missouri 
Nevada 
New 
Hampshire 
New Mexico 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Arkansas 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Minnesota 
Mississippi  
Montana 
Nebraska  
New Jersey 
New York 
Oklahoma 
South 
Dakota  
Washington 
Wisconsin  
Wyoming 
What distinguishes the 66 plans with trusts from the 35 plans—including 
those in Illinois, New Jersey, and New York—without retiree healthcare trusts? And 
for those plans with trusts, why have some benefited from disciplined annual 
contributions while others remain largely or entirely unfunded? To find the answers, 
this Part turns to a first-of-its-kind empirical analysis of public-sector retiree 
healthcare plans. 
A. Data & Analytical Approach 
This Article compiles an original dataset that tracks state-administered 
retiree healthcare plans. A review of state statutes and comprehensive annual- 
                                                                                                            
 83. Analyses of total state assets and total state liabilities for retiree healthcare 
benefits suggest that approximately 7% of these liabilities were funded as of 2015. See ALEX 
BROWN & JOSHUA FRANZEL, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE & NAT’L ASS’N 
OF STATE RETIREMENT ADM’RS, SPOTLIGHT ON RETIREE HEALTH CARE BENEFITS FOR STATE 
& LOCAL EMPLOYEES IN FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 1 (2017), https://slge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Spotlight-on-Retiree-Health-Care-Benefits-for-State-Employees-
in-FY-2015.pdf. 
 84. Of the states without trusts, two—Nebraska and South Dakota—report having 
no retiree healthcare liabilities. 
2018]       HEALTHCARE FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES         395 
financial reports identifies 101 such plans.85 For each plan, the dataset tracks trust 
formation and funding as of 2014 and 2015, the latest years for which 
comprehensive data is available.86 In particular, for each year, the data tracks three 
distinct metrics as the dependent variables of interest: first, whether a trust has been 
established for each plan in the dataset; second, funding discipline for each plan, as 
measured by the proportion of the reported ARC contributed to the plan;87 and third, 
the reported ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities. 
To understand the patterns in trust formation and funding, this Article looks 
both to plan-level differences in institutional design and to state-level measures of 
fiscal health. While prior research on retiree healthcare plans in the public sector has 
focused on state-by-state comparisons, such work has not considered key 
differences in how individual plans—and now the newly established retiree 
healthcare trusts—are designed and governed.88 As Table 3 illustrates, there is 
important variation in institutional design not just across plans from different states, 
but also—as in the case of Connecticut, for example—across plans from the same 
states. 
  
                                                                                                            
 85. While a few state financial reports include funding information for plans 
specific to state university systems, the dataset does not include such plans. 
 86. The existence of a trust is verified by review of applicable state statutes. Plan 
funding data is obtained from either state or plan actuarial reports. 
 87. ARC is a GASB term of art. It refers to the amount a public employer would 
have to contribute annually to cover the cost of benefits accrued in that year and to pay off 
any accrued unfunded liabilities in no more than 30 years. Since GASB has no enforcement 
power, the ARC is not technically required, but serves as a useful benchmark to assess annual 
contributions to retiree healthcare trusts. See GASB 45, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 88. See, e.g., BROWN & FRANZEL, supra note 5; PEW REPORT, supra note 24. 
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TABLE 3: Trust Adoption Across Selected Retiree Healthcare Plans: Examples 
Selected to Show Variation Across Plans 
State Plan Administration Trust (Year) 
Arkansas 
Arkansas State 
Employees Health 
Insurance Plan 
State and Public School 
Life and Health Insurance 
Board 
No 
Arkansas State 
Police Medical and 
Rx Plan 
QualChoice No 
California  
California 
Employers’ Retiree 
Benefit Trust Fund 
Public Employees 
Retirement System  
Yes 
(2007) 
Connecticut 
State Employee 
Plan 
State Comptroller: 
Healthcare Policy and 
Benefit Division 
Yes 
(2011) 
Retired Teacher 
Healthcare Plan 
Teachers’ Retirement 
Board 
No89 
Rhode 
Island  
State Employees 
Plan  
State Employees’ and 
Electing Teachers Other 
Post-Employment Benefits 
System (“Retiree 
Healthcare System”) 
Yes 
(2010) 
State Police Plan  Retiree Healthcare System Yes 
(2010) 
Board of Education 
Plan  
Retiree Healthcare System Yes 
(2010) 
Teachers Plan Retiree Healthcare System Yes 
(2010) 
Legislators Plan Retiree Healthcare System Yes 
(2010) 
Judicial Plan  Retiree Healthcare System Yes 
(2010) 
Drawing on prior research on the funding of public pension plans, this 
Article focuses on the variation in control and transparency as explanatory variables, 
while recognizing that public employers have limited resources to allocate to all 
                                                                                                            
 89. The Association of Retired Teachers of Connecticut has indicated that the 
Teachers Retirement Board received approval in 2014 to establish a Teachers Retirement 
Board Healthcare Trust Fund; however, no relevant legislation could be identified to date. 
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forms of employee compensation.90 Extensive review of the statutory provisions for 
each plan reveals significant differences in how state-administered retiree healthcare 
plans are governed and funded, in the degree of transparency about unfunded 
liabilities, and in the constituencies covered by the plans. The institutional features 
considered and coded, and the hypothesis associated with each one, are described 
below. Summary statistics are presented in Table A1 of Appendix A. 
Administration of retiree healthcare plan by retirement (i.e., pension) 
system: For each plan in the dataset, this variable identifies whether the retiree 
healthcare plan is administered by a state pension system. For plans administered by 
pension systems, the variable is coded as 1; otherwise the variable is coded as 0. 
Approximately 47% of the plans in the sample are administered by pension systems. 
The hypothesis is that situating retiree health plans under the same administrative 
“roof” as pension plans should mitigate the distinction between the two types of 
post-employment benefits. Moreover, pension boards’ expertise and familiarity with 
the trust mechanism and with prefunding benefits should increase the likelihood of 
trust formation for retiree healthcare plans. Indeed, some pension systems actively 
advertise their trust services for local government plans.91 Although the creation of 
a trust requires legislative approval, legislators may be swayed by pressure from and 
the institutional expertise of the pension-system boards. Once the trust is in place, 
however, pension-system administrators are likely to have relatively limited control 
over actual contributions made—or not made—into the trusts. The same variation 
in funding discipline that characterizes pension plans (all of which have trusts) can 
be expected to characterize retiree healthcare plans with trusts.92 Therefore, 
                                                                                                            
 90. Analysis of funding patterns among U.S. public pension plans suggests that 
the variation in institutional design—particularly with respect to the allocation of control over 
funding decisions and the availability of mechanisms to monitor and enforce funding 
commitments—is likely to be associated with variation in funding discipline among retiree 
healthcare plans. See, e.g., STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET 
CRISIS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 20 (2014), 
https://www.pgpf.org/sites/default/files/state_budget_crisis_task_force_finalreport_011420
14.pdf; Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public 
Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117 (2015); Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. 
Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663 
(2015). 
 91. Some state retirement systems, such as CalPERS, have been actively 
marketing their retiree healthcare trust services to local governments. CalPERS charges such 
local governments fees for trust administration and asset management. See California 
Employers’ Retiree Benefit Trust (CERBT) Fund, CALPERS (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/employers/benefit-programs/cerbt (“CERBT charges 
employers a single fee rate to cover all program costs” including compliance, investment 
management, legal services, ongoing administration, record keeping, reporting, start-up, 
transfer of assets, termination, and trustee/custodial services). Private service providers in the 
business of public plan consulting have also been quite active in encouraging public entities 
to set up trusts. See, e.g., Debunking the Top 6 Myths of OPEB Prefunding, PUB. AGENCY 
RET. SERVS. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.pars.org/2016/03/debunking-the-top-6-myths-of-
OPEB-prefunding/ (“[I]t is clear that [retiree healthcare] trusts are much more flexible than 
many first think . . . they lower liabilities, act as a rainy day fund, help to improve credit 
ratings and be accessed to pay for OPEB costs at any time . . . .”). 
 92. Shnitser, supra note 90 at 687–91. 
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administration by a retirement system is not expected to be associated with better 
funding discipline or higher funding levels. 
Actuarial determination of annual contributions: For each plan in the 
dataset, this variable categorizes the applicable funding policy. Specifically, it tracks 
whether annual contributions to the plan are determined by an actuarial calculation 
(coded as 1) or whether contribution amounts are set in statute or subject to any kind 
of caps or restrictions (coded as 0). Table 4 offers examples of both types of 
provisions. 
TABLE 4: Examples of Statutory Provisions for the Determination of the Employer 
Contribution 
Retiree 
Healthcare Plan Provisions for Determination of Employer Contribution 
Rhode Island 
(actuarial 
determination) 
Section 36-12.1-19(a) provides that “Rhode Island shall make 
its contribution for the maintenance of the system . . . by 
annually appropriating an amount equal to a percentage of the 
total compensation . . . . The percentage shall be computed by 
the actuary employed by the OPEB Board and shall be 
certified by the OPEB Board to the director of 
administration . . . . In arriving at the yearly employer 
contribution the actuary shall determine the value of: 
(1) The contributions made by the members; 
(2) Income on investments; and 
(3) Other income of the system” 
Section 36-12.1-19(b) states that the “[a]ctuary shall compute 
the yearly employer contribution that will: 
(1) Pay the actuarial estimate of the normal cost for the 
next succeeding fiscal year; 
(2) Amortize the unfunded liability of the system as of 
June 30, 2006, utilizing a time period not to exceed 
thirty (30) years.”93 
New Mexico 
Post-
Employment 
Healthcare Plan 
(statutory 
determination) 
Section 10-7C-15 provides that “[e]ach participating 
employer shall make contributions to the fund pursuant to the 
following provisions: 
(1) for participating employees who are not members of 
an enhanced retirement plan, the employer’s 
contribution shall equal: 
(a) one and three-tenths percent of each 
participating employee’s salary for the period 
from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2010 . . . 
                                                                                                            
 93. 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-12.1-19(a)–(b) (West 2009). 
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(d) two percent of each participating employee’s 
salary beginning July 1, 2012 . . .  
Notwithstanding any other provision in the Retiree Health 
Care Act and at the first session of the legislature following 
July 1, 2013, the legislature shall review . . . the employer and 
employee contributions . . . in order to ensure the actuarial 
soundness of the benefits provided under the Retiree Health 
Care Act.”94 
Approximately 27% of all the plans in the sample and 41% of the plans that 
have trusts are subject to statutory provisions that provide for actuarial determination 
of annual contributions. To be clear, contributions based on actuarial analyses are 
not necessarily more generous than those set in statute, and indeed statutorily set 
contributions can and do exceed actuarially determined rates.95 Furthermore, state 
legislatures can and do override the actuarial calculations and contribute less than 
the amount determined by the actuarial analyses set forth in the statute.96 Yet the 
delegation of the contribution calculation does provide an anchor point for any 
subsequent modifications and shields the contribution amount—at least to some 
extent—from budgetary politics and legislative revisions. Therefore, the delegation 
of rate setting to an actuarial body is expected to be associated with better funding 
discipline and higher funding levels. 
Cost-sharing plans: For each plan in the dataset, this transparency variable 
tracks whether the plan is a cost-sharing plan (coded as 1; all other plans coded as 0) 
that allows multiple employers to pool together their assets and liabilities, rather 
than apportion liabilities to each individual employer. Approximately 39% of the 
plans in the sample are cost-sharing plans. On the one hand, the inclusion of multiple 
employers in cost-sharing plans may increase political support for trust formation, 
particularly from municipalities facing significant unfunded liabilities. On the other 
hand, under GASB Standard No. 45, employers in cost-sharing plans are subject to 
less-stringent disclosure requirements about the liabilities associated with their 
employees. Whereas an employer that participates in a single-employer or an agent 
plan (in which multiple employers pool assets but only for investment purposes) 
must disclose the funding data for its employees, an employer in a cost-sharing plan 
reports such statistics only for the plan as a whole. Thus, because employers in cost-
sharing plans are subject to less-stringent disclosure requirements, and there is less 
                                                                                                            
 94. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7C-15 (2009). 
 95. See, e.g., GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., NORTH DAKOTA RETIREE HEALTH 
INSURANCE CREDIT FUND, ACTUARIAL VALUATION AS OF JULY 1, 2016, at A3 (2016), 
https://ndpers.nd.gov/image/cache/retiree-health-credit-valuation-2016.pdf (“The 
contributions that are made by employers are based on fixed contribution rates that are set by 
statute (and not based on the actuarially determined rate). The statutory contribution rate is 
higher than the actuarial contribution rate.”). 
 96. Even across plans with actuarially determined contributions, some plans did 
not receive 100% of the ARC over the 2014–2015 period. See infra Figure 2; see also 
Shnitser, supra note 90, at 693 (discussing a similar dynamic in the context of pension 
funding).  
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transparency about their retiree healthcare obligations, cost-sharing plans may face 
less pressure to achieve sound funding goals. 
Plans that cover only state judges or elected officials: This variable 
identifies whether each plan covers only a select group of state employees. Plans 
that cover only judges or elected officials are coded as 1; all other plans coded as 0. 
Approximately 13% of plans in the sample fall into the former category. Coverage 
of such select—and presumably relatively powerful—constituencies is expected to 
be associated with a greater likelihood for trust formation, better funding discipline 
(until full funding is reached), and funding levels. 
Total retiree healthcare liabilities-to-personal-state-income ratio: This 
variable measures the total obligations (including funded and unfunded liabilities) 
relative to the personal income in each state.97 States with relatively expansive 
benefit programs may be simultaneously drawn to the advantages of prefunding 
through a trust and concerned about the ability to marshal dollars for the 
contributions. Higher ratios, which ultimately demand relatively greater state 
resources to be channeled toward retiree healthcare benefits, are expected to be 
associated with worse funding discipline and lower funding levels. 
Funding ratio for state pension plans: This variable measures the 
aggregate ratio of assets to liabilities for each state’s pension plans in the year prior 
to the reporting year.98 Greater funding levels across a state’s pension plans can 
indicate a commitment to the funding of retirement benefits generally (either by 
disciplined contributions, lower benefit levels, or some combination of both). 
However, to the extent that such a commitment uses up available state resources, it 
can also cut against healthcare trust funding. Retiree healthcare trusts may also be 
less of a priority for plans that offer very limited (and relatively inexpensive) post-
employment benefits. In addition, because credit rating agencies do not consider 
retiree healthcare liabilities in isolation, but together with pension and other forms 
of debt, states with relatively better-funded pension plans may be subject to less 
pressure from credit rating agencies and public debt markets. 
State cash solvency: This variable provides a measure of the state 
government’s cash position relative to current or short-term liabilities.99 A better 
cash-solvency position is expected to be associated with greater likelihood of trust 
formation, as well as better funding discipline and funding levels, although it could 
also indicate a state government’s preference to hold onto resources rather than 
contribute them to retiree healthcare plans. 
                                                                                                            
 97. NORCROSS & GONZALEZ, supra note 46, at 20. State personal income, as 
calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, is defined as the “the sum of net earnings by 
place of residence, property income, and personal current transfer receipts.” Id. at 20 n.15 
(quoting State Personal Income 2014, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Mar. 25, 2015), 
https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2015/spi0315.htm). 
 98. Data compiled by the George Mason University Mercatus Center. See 
NORCROSS & GONZALEZ, supra note 46, at 47–48 tbl.A7. 
 99. See id. 
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Credit rating: Drawing on Standard & Poor’s state credit-rating data from 
2013 and 2014, this variable assigns a numerical value (on a scale of 1–8) to each 
state rating. For the regression analysis, a dummy variable identifies plans in states 
with a rating of AA- or lower. To the extent that large, unfunded retiree healthcare 
liabilities may hurt credit ratings, states with lower credit ratings may be under 
greater pressure to establish and fund retiree healthcare trusts.100 However, such 
states may also lack the funds to contribute to the trusts. 
Percentage of public employees covered by unions: This variable tracks 
the percentage of public employees in each state that are covered by public-sector 
unions.101 Although unions have historically targeted higher benefit levels and 
stronger legal protections (and so greater union representation may be associated 
with larger unfunded liabilities), their focus has begun to shift to funding discipline 
and funding levels.102 
B. Trust Formation: Results and Discussion 
The first empirical inquiry focuses on the determinants of trust formation. 
What distinguishes the plans with trusts from the plans without trusts? Figure 1 
offers preliminary evidence that the identity of the plan administrator plays a role. 
In effect, retiree healthcare plans that are administered by pension systems look 
more like pension plans in terms of funding. Retiree healthcare plans that are 
administered by state health and human-resources agencies, meanwhile, look more 
like healthcare arrangements for active employees. For the latter group, expenses 
are funded only as they are incurred on an annual basis. Although GASB Standard 
No. 45 may provide enough incentives for plans to move to a trust model—no matter 
the plan administrator—the transition costs are likely to be greater for plans 
administered outside pension systems. 
 
  
                                                                                                            
 100. Ratings agencies such as Standard & Poors have confirmed that retiree 
healthcare obligations are “important to credit quality.” See SPAIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 12; 
see also STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURER, DEBT AFFORDABILITY 
STUDY 15 (2017) (reporting that the state’s unfunded liability for retiree healthcare is $32.5 
billion dollars and advising that the liabilities are “receiving increased attention” from the 
credit rating agencies), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Debt%20Affordability
/Final%20DAAC_2017.pdf. 
 101. See Union Membership & Coverage Database from the CPS, 
UNIONSTATS.COM, http://www.unionstats.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). 
 102. See Peter W. Saltzman, Long-Term Funding for Retiree Health Benefits, CA. 
PUB. EMP. REL. J. No. 178, at 5–8 (2006) (describing the 2005 negotiations between the Bay 
Area Rapid Transit District and the Amalgamated Transit Union as among “the first in the 
country in which the long-term funding of [retiree healthcare] liabilities was addressed and 
resolved”). 
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FIGURE 1: Plan Administration and Prevalence of Retiree Healthcare Trusts as of 
2015 
 
The logistic regression analysis presented in Table 5 confirms that the 
coefficient on pension-system administration is positive and statistically significant. 
Retiree healthcare plans in states where the pension plans are better funded, 
meanwhile, are less likely to have trusts. The result likely reflects the limited public 
resources available for all forms of employee benefits and the lower priority that 
retiree healthcare plans have in the queue for taxpayer dollars. Notably, several of 
the plan features and state characteristics analyzed in Table 5 do not appear to have 
statistically significant association with the likelihood of trust formation. The result 
likely reflects the relatively technical and bureaucratic nature of trust formation at 
the state level, which is unlikely to attract significant attention from interest groups, 
as well as the competing incentives of public employers in cost-sharing plans. In 
addition, the analysis necessarily considers only a moment in time. To the extent 
that many trusts were established prior to 2015, the lack of statistical significance 
for state-level measures of fiscal health is not surprising. 
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TABLE 5:  Likelihood That Retiree Healthcare Plan Had a Trust in 2015 
This table presents a series of logit regressions using a binary dependent 
variable that indicates whether a plan had a trust associated with it in 2015. Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
 
C. Funding Discipline & Funding Levels: Results and Discussion 
The mere creation of a trust does not, in and of itself, ensure the funding of 
retiree healthcare plans. Indeed, to the extent that the GASB rules permit plan 
sponsors to justify favorable actuarial assumptions with expectations of future 
contributions to the trusts,103 a public employer’s decision to establish a trust does 
not necessarily even reflect a commitment to funding discipline.104 The Louisiana 
                                                                                                            
 103. See GASB 45, supra note 8, ¶ 13. GASB stated that “the investment return 
assumption (discount rate) should be the estimated long term investment yield on the 
investments that are expected to be used to finance the payment of benefits.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 104. Indeed, scholars like Josh Rauh and Robert Pozen have expressed concern that 
the GASB rules and particularly GASB Standard No. 75, discussed in Part III infra, will allow 
state and local governments to benefit immediately from rosy assumptions without any way 
of ensuring that plan sponsors follow through with the annual contributions required to reach 
full funding. See Robert C. Pozen & Joshua D. Rauh, Relief for Cities’ Budget Busting 
Healthcare Costs, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2015, at A13. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Plan Administered by Retirement System 1.584** 1.442** 1.835** 1.741*
(0.664) (0.656) (0.845) (0.904)
Cost-Sharing Plan 0.455 0.389
(0.469) (0.520)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 0.354 0.008
(0.933) (1.018)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to 
Personal Income Ratio -2.236 -2.887
(11.119) (10.936)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 0.051 0.055
(0.189) (0.188)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in 
Prior Year -0.053* -0.053*
(0.029) (0.029)
Percentage of State Public Employees 
Represented by Unions in Prior Year -0.001 0.000
(0.019) (0.018)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year -0.898 -0.891
(1.194) (1.264)
Constant -0.000 -0.146 4.016* 3.885
(0.363) (0.366) (2.282) (2.375)
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.0967 0.104 0.149 0.153
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Binary Dep. Var. = 1 if Trust is in Place; 0 Otherwise  
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state legislature, for example, approved the creation of a retiree healthcare trust in 
2008, but the trust was not funded as of year-end 2015. The State of Connecticut 
also committed to prefund its retiree healthcare liabilities in 2008, but deferred 
payments because of budget constraints, prompting the State Treasurer of 
Connecticut to advocate for a “stronger funding policy.”105 
The Treasurer’s plea is consistent with evidence from public-sector funding 
of pension benefits. The evidence suggests that trust creation is more likely to have 
a meaningful impact on retiree healthcare funding if it is coupled with reforms that 
facilitate disciplined annual contributions to the trust. Control over the 
determination of the annual contribution to the benefit plan is particularly 
significant.106 Of the plans that have irrevocable trusts, 41% receive contributions 
that are determined by an actuarial calculation.107 Contributions for the rest of the 
plans are statutorily fixed or determined at the discretion of the legislative body. As 
Figure 2 and 3 show, plans for which contributions are determined actuarially 
receive a greater proportion of the ARCs and are better funded.108 Tables 6 and 7 
                                                                                                            
 105. Press Release, Office of the State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, Other Post-
Employment Benefits (OPEB) Trust Fund Nears Entry to Higher-Returning Investments 
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.ott.ct.gov/pressreleases/press2013/PrR020713OPEBreturns 
Higher.pdf. Examples from other jurisdictions abound. For example, in New York City, the 
retiree health benefits trust has been used as a kind of rainy-day fund for the City. See Carol 
Kellermann, Make NYC’s Retiree Health Benefit Trust More Trustworthy, HUFFINGTON POST: 
THE BLOG (May 26, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carol-
kellermann/make-nycs-retiree-health_b_10149194.html (observing that “since the creation of 
the fund, deposits have been made in good economic times, but it has been raided for budget 
relief in bad times” and advocating for “explicit guidelines requiring annual deposits and 
limiting withdrawals only to special circumstances, such as when there are unexpected spikes 
in retiree health-insurance premiums”). To date, the city administration has resisted any 
measures to impose additional protections on the retiree healthcare trust fund. See Sally 
Goldenberg, Councilman Wants Protections for Retiree Health Care Fund, POLITICO (Feb. 
23, 2015, 6:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-
hall/story/2015/02/councilman-wants-protections-for-retiree-health-care-fund-019917 
(reporting that De Blasio has indicated that “[w]e are confident in this responsible approach, 
and do not believe a charter amendment to dictate spending priorities is either necessary or 
appropriate”). 
 106. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-12.1-19 (West 2009) (requiring the 
actuary to compute, and the state of Rhode Island to contribute “a yearly employer 
contribution that will: (1) Pay the actuarial estimate of the normal cost for the next succeeding 
fiscal year; (2) Amortize the unfunded liability of the system as of June 30, 2006 utilizing a 
time period not to exceed thirty (30) years”). Others have limited the ability of public 
employers to incur additional unfunded liabilities. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 
§ 286-B (2013) (“Unfunded liabilities may not be created except those resulting from 
experience losses.”). 
 108. State and local governments are also experimenting with other means of 
promoting and enforcing retiree healthcare plan funding. For example, the funding—as 
opposed to just the scope of retiree healthcare benefits—has become the subject of CBAs and 
state legislation. See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 4 (describing California’s “recent agreement 
with one of its employee unions to have employees prefund some of their retirement 
benefits”). Meanwhile states like Hawaii have required automatic draws on certain tax 
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below confirm that the greater constraints on legislative control over annual 
contributions are associated with stronger funding discipline and higher funding 
levels. 
FIGURE 2: Average Percentage of ARC Received in Fiscal Years 2014-2015 
 
  
                                                                                                            
revenues to make up any gaps between the actuarially required contribution amounts and the 
amounts actually contributed in a given year. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87A-42 (West 2015) 
(“In any fiscal year . . . in which a county public employer’s contributions into the fund are 
less than the amount of the annual required contribution . . . the director of finance shall deduct 
the amount necessary to meet the county public employer’s annual required contribution from 
the revenues . . . and transfer the amount to the board for deposit into the appropriate account 
of the separate trust fund.”). 
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FIGURE 3: Average Funding Levels in 2015 
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TABLE 6: Institutional Features, State Fiscal Health and Plan Funding Discipline 
in 2014-2015 Across Retiree Healthcare Plans with Trusts 
This table presents the results of a series of pooled OLS regressions of 
institutional variables of interest on plan funding discipline, as measured by the 
percentage of ARC contributed in a given year. The regressions include a year 
dummy (not shown), and standard errors are clustered by state and year. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination of 
Annual Contribution 24.376*** 23.716*** 24.174*** 22.664***
(7.403) (7.437) (7.452) (7.242)
Plan Administered by Retirement System -1.941 -6.511
(6.873) (7.046)
Cost-Sharing Plan -4.815 -9.056
(6.699) (5.646)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 14.099 3.410
(9.147) (7.709)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to Personal 
Income Ratio -306.457*** -302.985***
(101.397) (100.993)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 6.421*** 6.832***
(2.110) (2.086)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in Prior Year -0.689** -0.627**
(0.263) (0.258)
Percentage of State Public Employees Represented by 
Unions in Prior Year -0.236 -0.250
(0.171) (0.160)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year 13.804** 17.588***
(5.774) (5.652)
Constant 63.091*** 64.774*** 132.835*** 136.214***
(4.478) (9.329) (22.501) (23.395)
Observations 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.092 0.114 0.250 0.272
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. Var. = Percentage of ARC Contributed 
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TABLE 7: Institutional Features, State Fiscal Health, and Plan Funding Levels in 
2015 Across Retiree Healthcare Plans with Trusts 
This table presents the results of a series of OLS regressions of institutional 
variables of interest on plan funding, as measured by the reported ratio of assets to 
liabilities. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
While the choice of plan-level funding provisions is statistically significant 
across a variety of specifications, the coefficients on other plan-specific 
characteristics—such as transparency and administration by a retirement system—
are not statistically significant over the period analyzed. As noted in Section II.A, 
decreased transparency across cost-sharing plans can cut in competing directions, 
while the identity of the plan administrator is likely to matter less once a trust is in 
place and funding provisions have been set by statute. Plan-funding ratios do appear 
to be significantly higher across plans that cover only judges and legislators, as 
compared to those that cover other types of employees. This finding suggests that 
judges and legislators recognize the importance of plan funding and are able to mold 
the relevant institutions to facilitate the desired result. Table B1 of Appendix B 
confirms that the results are not driven by plan size. While plans for judges and 
legislatures cover relatively smaller groups of employees, controlling for the size of 
payroll does not change the result. 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 also underscore the extent to which retiree 
healthcare plans are intertwined with state politics and fiscal policies. As expected, 
positive indicators of fiscal health are associated with better funding discipline for 
retiree healthcare trusts. By the same token, plans with retiree healthcare liabilities 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination of 
Annual Contribution 36.057** 34.144*** 26.637* 31.725**
(15.416) (11.375) (14.086) (14.032)
Plan Administered by Retirement System 0.627 4.921
(14.888) (10.599)
Cost-Sharing Plan 2.552 -0.782
(8.770) (9.847)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 106.038** 101.255**
(41.314) (43.388)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to Personal 
Income Ratio -527.756*** -378.581**
(141.270) (149.721)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 11.182*** 7.550**
(2.471) (3.275)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in Prior Year -0.721 -0.631
(0.605) (0.616)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year 29.434 -5.361
(30.382) (37.249)
Percentage of State Public Employees Represented by 
Unions in Prior Year 0.449 0.172
(0.431) (0.393)
Constant 26.268*** 11.060 83.050* 69.292
(7.612) (8.072) (41.213) (48.507)
Observations 66 66 66 66
R-squared 0.085 0.440 0.215 0.493
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. Var.= Funded Ratio 
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that are relatively larger in proportion to state resources are associated with worse 
funding discipline and lower funding levels. Worse funding discipline also 
characterizes plans from states with relatively better-funded pensions, a finding that 
underscores the risks of analyzing either program in isolation. A poor credit rating 
in a prior year is associated with better funding discipline. This result likely reflects 
the ratings agencies’ increased focus on retiree healthcare liabilities and, 
accordingly, the pressure from such agencies to show efforts to address funding 
gaps. Finally, the coefficient on the unionization variable is not statistically 
significant, which is consistent with the traditional union focus on benefit levels and 
applicable legal protections. 
To ensure that results are not driven by the cases in which annual 
contributions or funding ratios are either close to 0 or exceed 100%, and to account 
for certain limitations of the data as currently reported,109 Tables B2 and B3 of 
Appendix B present alternate specifications of the dependent variables. Table B2 
uses a binary dependent variable that indicates whether a plan has received at least 
70% of the ARC in given year. Under this specification, 53% of the observations 
are coded as “1” for having received at least 70% of the required contribution; the 
rest are coded as “0.” Table B3 uses a binary dependent variable that indicates 
whether a plan has reached a ratio of assets to liabilities that equals or exceeds 10% 
in 2015. Under this specification, 62% of the observations are coded as “1” for 
having reached the 10% funding threshold; the rest are coded as “0.” The results are 
consistent with the findings from Tables 6 and 7. In these specifications, however, 
the coefficient on the variable that identifies judge- and legislator-only plans is not 
statistically significant in the analysis of funding ratios. This suggests that coverage 
of such specific state employees does not help distinguish plans that have reached 
the 10% funding threshold from those that have not. Instead, the variable appears to 
identify plans that are considerably better funded than the average plan in the 
sample. 
In sum, the empirical findings in this Article offer the first insights into the 
complex political economy of retiree healthcare funding. Over a decade, retiree 
healthcare trusts have become the norm, rather than the exception. Moreover, 
institutional features—most notably administration by pension systems, constraints 
on legislative control over annual funding decisions, and the involvement of 
powerful stakeholders, like judges and legislators—have been associated with more-
robust patterns of trust formation and funding. Finally, while the contours of the 
trust revolution are clear, the empirical analysis underscores the importance of 
continuing to monitor funding patterns, particularly as states revise their initial 
responses to the 2004 GASB rules and adapt to additional standardization 
requirements in effect as of 2017.110 
                                                                                                            
 109. See infra note 110. 
 110. The data analyzed in this Article reflects only the first decade of public-
employer decisions after the enactment of GASB Standard No. 45. To the extent that the trusts 
and the related institutions are relatively new, funding patterns may reflect one-time transfers, 
unusual funding sources, or gradual ramping up to actuarially sound funding. A reassessment 
of such patterns over a longer period should offer greater insights about the longer-term 
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III. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR RETIREE HEALTHCARE BENEFITS 
A decade after GASB first required state and local governments to disclose 
the funding levels of retiree healthcare plans, two-thirds of state-administered plans 
now have irrevocable trusts to set aside assets for future benefit payments. The 
developments have drawn mixed reactions. Some have expressed concern about the 
rise of the trusts, warning that the trusts could strengthen legal protections and foster 
a kind of “doubling down” on retiree healthcare benefits.111 Others, meanwhile, have 
lamented the limited progress on plan funding and the significant number of trusts 
that remain either entirely or mostly empty.112 In the intervening period, GASB has 
issued additional new rules, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was enacted (and 
subsequently targeted for repeal), and public employers have made numerous 
changes to their retiree healthcare plans. 
This Part reviews recent developments with an eye to the long-term 
viability of retiree healthcare benefits in the United States. First, it demonstrates that 
within the current legal framework, the establishment of retiree healthcare trusts is 
not likely to alter the legal status of the benefits in material ways, particularly as 
public employers seek to prevent this possibility through drafting choices in the 
enabling statutes. Accordingly, even with the proliferation of retiree healthcare 
trusts, so long as there is uncertainty over whether such obligations constitute 
binding, legal contracts, some state and local governments will be reluctant to 
commit resources to irrevocable trusts. While additional disclosure requirements 
and specific governance reforms—as indicated by the empirical results in Part II—
can promote transparency and funding discipline in the short term, they are unlikely 
to resolve the challenges inherent in “contracting” for healthcare benefits decades 
into the future. Long-term viability of such benefits in the public sector may require 
state and local governments to reconsider the form of benefits provided and the 
allocation of risk between employers and employees. This Part concludes by 
mapping out the spectrum of possible reforms and the tradeoffs inherent in each. 
                                                                                                            
trajectory in retiree healthcare funding. Reassessing the data after 2017 will also allow 
researchers to take advantage of certain standardization requirements promulgated by GASB 
in 2015. Previously, GASB Standard No. 45 has allowed plan sponsors significant discretion 
in the selection of actuarial assumptions used to calculate funding ratios and annual 
contributions. The analysis here relies on the plan data as reported by the plan sponsors. As 
standardized calculations become available, it will be important to consider whether, and 
how, plan sponsors alter their funding patterns. See GASB 45, supra note 8, ¶ 13 (leaving 
significant room for interpretation in its guidance that “the investment return assumption 
(discount rate) should be the estimated long-term investment yield on the investments that are 
expected to be used to finance the payment of benefits”). 
 111. Stephen Eide & Daniel DiSalvo, A Health Benefit We Can’t Afford: Retiree 
Medical Expenses Are Busting the City’s Budget, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016,              
5:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/eide-disalvo-health-benefit-afford-article-
1.2581772 (“Prefunding amounts to doubling down on a perk that has long outlived its 
justification, and repeating the mistakes of pensions. New York has been prefunding pensions 
for decades and still remains $52 billion short in what it has promised to workers and 
retirees.”). 
 112. Pozen & Rauh, supra note 104. 
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A. A Matter of Trust? The Security of Healthcare Promises Today 
While the amounts set aside in the trusts may be used only to satisfy the 
claims of plan participants, this Section considers whether the partial prefunding of 
liabilities through a trust could affect the nature of the legal obligation to provide 
retiree healthcare benefits.113 It also assesses the efforts of plan sponsors to explicitly 
limit the impact of plan funding choices on the legal status of plan benefits. As public 
employers face calls to avoid establishing retiree healthcare trusts, an understanding 
of the trusts’ legal implications is particularly critical.114 
Under the current framework, the retiree healthcare trust could affect the 
legal status of benefits in at least three circumstances. The first is in the case where 
the applicable statutes or ordinances are, in fact, deemed to create a contractual 
obligation with respect to the provision of retiree healthcare benefits. In such cases, 
courts analyze any proposed changes under the Federal Constitution’s Contract 
Clause or the applicable state constitution’s contract clause.115 In determining 
whether a change to the plan is constitutional under the Contract Clause, courts 
consider whether it constitutes a substantial impairment of the contractual 
relationship, and if so, whether it is nevertheless justified by “an important public 
purpose” and is “reasonable and necessary.”116 The funding status of retiree 
healthcare plans may be a factor in the evaluation of these requirements.117 In both 
the pension and retiree healthcare context, courts have held that the proposed 
modification to the benefits must be “materially related to the theory of a 
pension/medical subsidy system and its successful operation” and have explicitly 
considered the funding level of the retiree benefit plan at issue. For example, in Los 
Angeles City Attorney’s Association v. City of Los Angeles, the court held that 
because the goal of the contested freeze ordinance was to “resolve the City’s pending 
fiscal emergency, the ordinance [was] not materially related to the theory of a 
pension/medical subsidy system and its successful operation.” The court observed 
that “the economic viability of the medical subsidy system is quite robust given that 
it is pre-funded and its operation includes assumptions for increasing medical 
                                                                                                            
 113. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 7, at 1180 (noting that “the law is unclear 
whether the vesting of [post-retirement health benefits] may occur once a state decides on 
pre-funding as a means of financing [post-retirement health benefits]”). 
 114. Some commentators have warned state and local governments to avoid 
creating trusts to not strengthen the legal protections for nonpension benefits. See, e.g., 
DISALVO & EIDE, supra note 14, at 11–12; DiSalvo & Eide, supra note 14. 
 115. MONAHAN, supra note 43 at 10. 
 116. See, e.g., Andrews, Jr. v. Lombardi, No KC20131128, 2017 WL 532353, at 
*38–40 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2017); see generally Monahan, supra note 35, at 1041. 
 117. See, e.g., Lombardi, 2017 WL 532353, at *38–40 (applying the Contract 
Clause analysis and finding that because “the City presented sufficient credible 
evidence . . . that the staggering unfunded retiree healthcare liability” created an 
“unprecedented emergency” of the sort that could give rise “to the City’s legitimate use of 
the police power,” the modifications to the retiree healthcare benefits satisfied the 
requirement that there be “a significant and legitimate public purpose” for the contested 
modifications). 
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coverage costs and inflation.”118 Given the prefunding of the benefits, the City could 
not argue that benefit reductions were necessary to ensure the viability of the retiree 
healthcare plan. Thus, as a practical matter, a funded trust may reduce the scope of 
permissible justifications for modifying a contract with public employees. 
By similar logic, a trust may also limit benefit cuts in the collective-
bargaining context, where, in connection with the establishment of the trust, the 
CBA explicitly establishes a retiree healthcare funding policy and requires public 
employers and employees to make contributions to the trust on an accrual basis. 
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that state employers and public-sector unions are 
embracing explicit funding commitments in their CBAs. For example, the recent 
agreement between the state and the Professional Engineers in California 
Government sets out, for the first time, employer and employee contributions to the 
retiree healthcare trust fund. It also includes a vesting schedule that links the credited 
years of service to the percentage of retiree health-insurance premiums to be covered 
by the employer.119 
Finally, the trust may matter in cases where the courts consider employer 
conduct as evidence of intent. As described in Part I, employer conduct may be 
introduced as extrinsic evidence when the written agreement between the employer 
and the employees is ambiguous or when the claim is based on a theory of implied 
contact or promissory estoppel. In such cases, evidence of the establishment and 
funding of a trust may be interpreted as reflecting the employer’s intent to provide 
retiree healthcare benefits that accrue and vest over the employees’ working years. 
Although a series of cases from California, for example, emphasizes that public- 
employer practices and policies do not translate into implied contract rights unless 
the plaintiff meets the heavy burden of establishing legislative intent to create such 
rights, extrinsic evidence can satisfy this standard.120 Courts may draw parallels with 
                                                                                                            
 118. L.A. City Attorneys Ass’n v. City of L.A., No. BS135294, at 15 (L.A. Super. 
Ct., Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.lacaa.org/docs/13-09-13-order-granting-writ.pdf. For the 
same principles applied to pension systems, see, e.g., Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 
784 (1983) (finding that “[t]o be sustained as reasonable, alterations of employees’ pension 
rights must bear some material relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful 
operation”). 
 119. See PROF’L ENG’RS IN CAL. GOV’T, 2015–2018 UNIT 9 MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT 
(PECG) AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 69 (2018), http://pecg.org/wp-content/uploads/Unit-
9-MOU-2015-2018-for-web.pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., Ret. Emps. Ass’n of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange, 742 F.3d 
1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing “the ‘heavy burden’ to show that the County intended to 
create an implied, vested contract right” and emphasizing that “[e]ven long-time government 
policies regarding retiree health benefits do not necessarily create lifetime rights”); Ret. 
Emps. Ass’n of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange, 266 P.3d 287, 296 (Cal. 2011) (noting 
that the suspension of “legislative control” in favor of an implied contract right requires 
“unmistakable” evidence so “that neither the governing body nor the public will be blindsided 
by unexpected obligations,” but holding that it is possible to establish requisite intent through 
extrinsic evidence.); see also L.A. City Attorneys Ass’n, No. BS135294, at 2–3 In Los Angeles 
City Attorneys Ass’n, the court found that while the “Los Angeles Administrative Code 
section 4.1103.2 creates a vested right in a medical subsidy that covers part or all of the cost 
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cases where an employer’s continued provision of retiree healthcare benefits after 
the expiration of the CBA was admitted as evidence to show that the employer 
intended for the benefits to continue.121 Similarly, in recent months, courts have 
looked to funding history,122 internal accounting methodologies,123 and buy-out 
calculations124 to resolve ambiguous contractual provisions and ascertain employer 
intent with respect to retiree healthcare benefits. Further, to the extent that the lack 
of funding has been cited to support the distinction between the legal status of retiree 
healthcare benefits and pension benefits, the convergence of funding practices 
makes the distinction harder to support.125 As an analytical matter, the fact that under 
GASB rules, retiree healthcare benefits now must be measured and reported on an 
                                                                                                            
of a medical plan to eligible employees,” the practice of pre-funding retiree health benefits 
does not “demonstrate a vested right to perpetually increasing subsidy but rather reflects 
prudent financial practice on the part of the city.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1008 (S.D. 
Ohio 2017) (“Honeywell’s course of conduct in continuing to provide coverage after the CBA 
expired provides strong support for the Court’s finding that Honeywell agreed to provide 
lifetime retiree healthcare benefits.”); Anderson v. Town of Smithfield, 2005 WL 3481627, 
at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005) (unpublished opinion); see also Poole v. City of Waterbury, 831 
A.2d 211 (Conn. 2003); Myers v. Schenectady, 244 A.D.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(finding defendant city’s “[19 year] practice of continuing to provide fully paid health 
insurance coverage . . . even after the expiration of the various collective bargaining 
agreements pursuant to which [retirees] obtained such benefits, constitutes very substantial 
evidence that the provisions in question were intended to provide benefits to retirees for the 
entire period of their retirement”). 
 122. Kendzierski v. Macomb Cty., 901 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) 
(looking to a bond funding proposal and a letter from the Macomb County Executive that 
referenced lifetime benefits and a 20-year history of funding such benefits to establish the 
intent of the parties). But see L.A. City Attorneys Ass’n, No. BS135294, at 10 (finding that a 
practice of pre-funding retiree health benefits does not “demonstrate a vested right to 
perpetually increasing subsidy but rather reflects prudent financial practice on the part of the 
city”). 
 123. Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. 
Ct. 761 (2018) (finding that extrinsic evidence indicated intent for healthcare benefits to vest 
for life, where the employer, in an accounting document, calculated retiree healthcare costs 
based on the employees’ life spans, and where the employer’s representatives repeatedly told 
employees that retirees would have healthcare coverage for their lifetimes). Notably, in its 
2018 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s finding that the CBA 
was ambiguous in the first place, concluding instead that “the only reasonable interpretation 
of the 1998 agreement is that the health care benefits expired when the collective-bargaining 
agreement expired in May 2004.” CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018). 
 124. UAW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 854 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Int’l Union, 2018 WL 1037569 (Feb. 26, 2018) 
(considering—as part of extrinsic-evidence review—the fact that the employer offered to buy 
out retirees’ healthcare coverage using values based on retirees’ life expectancies).  
 125. See, e.g., Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 
1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding in favor of the appellees, who argued, in part, that there 
is a “vast difference” between pension and retiree-health benefits, as evidenced by the fact 
that “[p]ensions are paid from an actuarially predetermined fund and are guaranteed for life. 
Health and welfare benefits are negotiated periodically and are paid from a fund consisting 
of employer contributions and last only the life of the collective bargaining agreement.”). 
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accrual basis, may undermine some of the traditional justifications for the claim that 
such benefits do not accrue during employees’ working years.126 
To be clear, any of the possible consequences described above are likely to 
arise only in the absence of an express agreement between the parties, or where such 
agreement is ambiguous as to the scope or duration of the benefits to be provided. 
Moreover, a review of the enabling statutes for retiree healthcare trusts reveals that 
public employers have sought to limit the legal consequences of the trusts by directly 
addressing the relationship between plan funding and plan benefits. As Table 8 
shows, a number of state governments have included statutory language expressly 
stating that the creation of the trust does not create a contractual obligation to 
provide benefits, nor does it otherwise define or expand participants’ rights to such 
benefits. Although no court has yet interpreted such provisions, prior deference to 
legislative intent suggests that such language would carry significant weight.127 
TABLE 8: Selected Statutory Provisions Addressing the Impact of Retiree 
Healthcare Trusts and Funding on the Legal Status of Benefits 
State Year Statutory Provision 
Kentucky  2010 “The establishment of Kentucky Retirement Systems 
insurance trust fund shall not diminish or expand the 
rights of any recipients, employees, or dependents to 
health benefits.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.701 (West 
2009). 
Michigan  2015 “The funding of postemployment health care benefits by 
a county, city, village, or township as provided in this 
act shall not constitute a contract to pay the 
postemployment health care benefits.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 141.2518 (West 2015). 
Tennessee  2015 “Nothing in this part shall be construed to define or 
otherwise grant any rights or privileges to other post-
employment benefits. The rights and privileges, if any, 
shall be governed by the terms of the state’s post-
employment benefit plans.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-27-
806 (West 2015). 
                                                                                                            
 126. See, e.g., Studier v. Michigan Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd., 698 N.W.2d 350, 358 
(Mich. 2005) (“Health care benefits . . . are not accrued . . . . [N]either the amount of health 
care benefits a public school employee receives nor the amount of the premium, subscription, 
or membership fee that MPSERS pays increases in relation to the number of years of service 
the retiree has performed.”). Notably, the dissent in this case cited the 2004 GASB guidance 
for the proposition that “cash payments and other retirement benefits, such as health care 
benefits, are conceptually similar transactions—both involve deferred compensation offered 
in exchange for current services-and should be accounted for in a similar way.” Id. at 678. 
 127. See supra Section I.B. 
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B. Disclosure and Governance Reforms 
While the mere establishment of retiree healthcare trusts does not make the 
promised benefits more secure, the examination of existing plans points to certain 
best practices for plan administration that, together with new GASB rules in effect 
as of 2017, can be expected to promote transparency and encourage stronger funding 
discipline.128 As an initial matter, states seeking to start prefunding retiree healthcare 
benefits should review the administrative structure for such benefits. As the results 
in Part II suggest, retiree healthcare plans administered by pension systems—which 
possess the relevant expertise and have incentives to manage additional assets—
have been associated with a higher rate of trust formation. The results in Part II, as 
well as similar findings in the pension literature, indicate that public employers 
should also consider limiting the role of state legislatures in annual contribution 
decisions. The delegation of authority over such decisions to actuarial bodies—and 
thus the relative distancing from the political process—has been associated with 
better funding discipline.129 
New reporting requirements for public employers—in effect for the 2017 
fiscal year—will also shed even greater light on retiree healthcare funding. Pursuant 
to the latest GASB pronouncement (“GASB Standard No. 75”), state and local 
governments will be required—for the first time—to include unfunded retiree 
healthcare liabilities on their balance sheets. Previously, the total unfunded 
liabilities were reported in supplementary materials, while only the annual retiree 
healthcare costs were included on the balance sheets.130 The new reporting 
requirements make retiree healthcare costs much more prominent, which in turn 
                                                                                                            
 128. GASB 75, supra note 11. Notably, the new standards in GASB Standard No. 
75—which bring the disclosure and reporting requirements for retiree healthcare benefits 
closer to those in place for pension benefits—were adopted over the opposition of some public 
employers. See generally GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ONLINE COMMENT 
LETTERS-PROJECT 34-1E, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176164132380&accept
edDisclaimer=true. The Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, for example, opposed 
the disclosure of retiree healthcare liabilities on the balance sheet, arguing that “OPERS’ 
health care plan is not contractually required or socially obligated and the Board actions to 
modify the plan demonstrate that lack of obligation.” Letter from Karen Carraher, CPA 
Executive Director, OPERS, to Director of Research and Technical Activities, Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (Aug. 22, 2014). The International Association of Firefighters 
objected to the application of pension-accounting rules to retiree healthcare benefits, since 
the latter “do not receive the same legal protections as pensions, and are frequently subject to 
modification or even termination.” Letter from Harold A. Schaitberger, General President, 
International Association of Fire Fighters, to Director of Research and Technical Activities, 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (Aug. 26, 2014). 
 129. See supra Part II; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 130. GASB 45, supra note 8, at summary. Pursuant to GASB Standard No. 75, state 
and local governments will no longer have to report how annual contributions to their plans 
compare to the ARC benchmark. GASB 75, supra note 11, 191–92. Thus, while additional 
information about each plan will be required, the benchmark commonly used to compare 
funding discipline across plans will be deemphasized. 
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should subject such costs to even closer scrutiny from legislators, credit rating 
agencies, taxpayers, and plan participants.131 
GASB Standard No. 75 also incentivizes plan sponsors to establish written 
contribution policies, rather than relying—as many plans currently do—on one-time 
or ad hoc appropriations to retiree healthcare plans. In specifying how plan sponsors 
must translate the value of future liabilities into present-day dollars, GASB Standard 
No. 75 provides that the discount-rate calculation hinges on the value of the assets 
set aside—and the assets expected to be set aside—in the trusts.132 Under this 
approach, the more assets a plan sponsor expects to set aside for the plan, the higher 
the permissible discount rate and accordingly, the lower the value of the accrued 
liabilities.133 The critical task of projecting future contributions falls on the plan 
actuary. For plans with contribution policies established by statute or contract, the 
actuary must use professional judgment to assess the written policies and the history 
of prior contributions. For plans without written policies, GASB Standard No. 75 
limits the projected future contributions to the average of the contributions actually 
made in the preceding five-year period.134 Written contribution policies—
particularly if combined with limits on legislative authority to modify or renege on 
the commitments—can serve as anchor points and political shields and are likely to 
be associated with stronger funding discipline. 
Efforts to promote funding discipline should be accompanied by efforts to 
promote transparency about the allocation of retiree-healthcare liabilities and the 
scope of permissible modifications to plan benefits. GASB Standard No. 75 
addresses the former by requiring all public employers, including those in the so-
called cost-sharing plans, to disclose the ratio of assets to liabilities attributable 
specifically to their employees.135 While the new requirement helps individual 
public employers understand their retiree healthcare liabilities, both employers and 
employees should also have access to a summary of the benefits that describes not 
only the benefits as currently provided (already required by GASB) but also the 
                                                                                                            
 131. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, DiNapoli 
Proposes Option to Help State & Local Governments Pay for Retiree Health Care (Apr. 13, 
2015), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/apr15/041315.htm (stating that “New York 
is behind the eight ball on this issue” and proposing legislation to “establish the legal structure 
for creating trusts that the state and local governments could use to start saving the funds 
needed to pay for these [retiree healthcare] benefits”). 
 132. All plan sponsors must use the entry-age cost method to calculate the actuarial 
present value of projected-benefit payments. The standardization of methodology is an 
important departure from prior GASB guidance and a key step in facilitating the comparison 
of retiree healthcare liabilities across plans. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 133. Plans that do not set aside any assets and continue the pay-as-you-go approach 
must discount liabilities using the relatively low municipal bond rate. 
 134. GASB 75, supra note 11, at 14–15. 
 135. Id. at vii. Under GASB Standard No. 45, employers participating in either 
single-employer or agent plans have been required to disclose the ratio of assets to liabilities 
attributable to each employer, but employers in cost-sharing plans have been required only to 
disclose the aggregate funding levels of the plans. As a result, a significant proportion of 
public employers—particularly municipalities—have not had to calculate or disclose their 
unfunded retiree healthcare liabilities. See Munnell et al., supra note 1. 
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permissible scope of benefit modifications. Individual employees should not have 
to perform their own legal analyses of the sort described in Part I to determine 
whether their benefits are secure. 
C. Re-Envisioning Retiree Healthcare 
The accounting and disclosure changes promulgated by GASB over the last 
decade have brought to the fore a larger question about the long-term future of 
employer-sponsored, post-employment benefits for public-sector employees. The 
future of employer-sponsored retiree healthcare benefits in the United States is 
intertwined with the future of healthcare reform. For example, the ACA’s 
establishment and regulation of health-insurance exchanges, together with Medicare 
reforms, arguably made employer-sponsored retiree health insurance a less-essential 
benefit.136 Whereas retirees not yet eligible for Medicare once faced extremely 
limited and expensive alternatives to employer-sponsored healthcare, the ACA’s 
public health-insurance exchanges—and the corresponding availability and renewal 
rules, prohibitions on exclusions and discrimination, and controlled rate setting—
aimed to ensure access to health insurance outside the employer context.137 The 
ACA’s provision of premium tax credits to eligible individuals who purchased 
insurance on an exchange meant that for a subset of early retirees, health insurance 
obtained through the exchanges may have been less costly than the insurance 
available through a former employer.138 Public employers have noticed the potential 
cost savings. Some—like Detroit and Chicago, among others—have terminated 
their benefit programs for retirees, thereby forcing the so-called early retirees onto 
the public exchanges.139 
                                                                                                            
 136. Most notably, the ACA aims to close Medicare Part D’s so-called donut hole, 
which has required Medicare beneficiaries to cover 100% of drug costs after reaching a 
specified threshold and before becoming eligible for catastrophic coverage. Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1036–40 
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-102, 1395w-152 (2012)); see generally Susan E. Cancelosi, 
The Bell Is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-Health Reform, 19 ELDER L.J. 49, 113–17 
(2011). 
 137. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 
119, 173–78 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)–(d) (2012)). 
 138. See Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., Will Divestment from Employment-
Based Health Insurance Save Employers Money? The Case of State and Local Governments, 
12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343, 353 (2015) (observing that 33% of state and local 
government retirees had incomes in the 138%–400% range of the Federal Poverty Line range, 
which would make them eligible for subsidies or cost sharing on the health insurance 
exchanges); Nadol et al., supra note 23, at 14 (discussing the report of the Retiree Health 
Benefits Commission, which found that 58% of annuitants in the Chicago city plan in 2014 
would pay less under the state’s exchange). 
 139. See Alana Semuels, Cities Are Eliminating the Healthcare Benefits Once 
Promised to Retirees, ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/cities-are-eliminating-the-healthcare-
benefits-once-promised-to-retirees/381375/; Fran Speilman, Emanuel Completes Three-Year 
Phaseout of Retiree Health Care Subsidy, CHI. SUN TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:01 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/emanuel-completes-three-year-phaseout-of-
retiree-health-care-subsidy/; Arin Mikailian, Glendale to Change Health Benefit for Retired 
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For public employers seeking to preserve retiree healthcare benefits, the 
challenge is to specify the appropriate allocation of risk between employers and 
employees. Who will bear the risk of retirees living longer than expected? Who will 
bear the risk that healthcare costs may increase in the future? And who will bear the 
risk that the public employer will lack either the funds or the political will to 
continue with the chosen arrangement? 
The options for longer-term reform fall along a spectrum. Eliminating 
retiree healthcare benefits entirely represents one extreme, leaving employees to 
bear the entire risk of health coverage in retirement.140 On the other end of the 
spectrum, employers can continue to provide either fully or partially subsidized 
health insurance for retirees, with the benefit expressed as a percentage of the health-
insurance premiums covered on behalf of current employees. For so long as such 
benefits remain in place, employers bear the longevity risk, as well as the risk of any 
increases to the cost of healthcare. Under the current legal regime, in most 
jurisdictions, employees bear the risk that the employer may cease to offer the 
benefits at any point or to curtail them significantly. As described above, most 
employers that have traditionally offered premium subsidies have pursued a variety 
of incremental cost-cutting measures in recent years. 
Between the two extremes are models that seek either to specify the amount 
of the “defined benefit” that will be paid to retirees or to transform the benefit into 
a defined contribution arrangement. By expressing the benefit in terms of dollars 
and by linking the amount of dollars to years worked, both models facilitate the 
establishment of clear accrual and vesting rules. Such rules, in turn, permit 
employers and employees to determine how much noncash compensation an 
employee has earned at any given point and to ensure that, subject to the vesting 
rules, accrued benefits for work already performed are adequately protected. 
The first model transforms the retiree healthcare benefit into a dollar 
subsidy to be used by retirees to offset the costs of healthcare in retirement. Instead 
of taking on the obligation to provide subsidized health insurance in retirement, the 
employer commits to providing a certain number of dollars each year.141 Employers 
                                                                                                            
City Workers, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/socal/glendale-
news-press/tn-gnp-glendale-to-end-health-benefit-for-retired-city-workers-20151007-
story.html (describing how, in October of 2015, the city of Glendale voted to end the 
provision of subsidized health insurance to its seven hundred retirees, with the ACA as a 
“game changer” in the decision). One set of economists projected that state and local 
governments adopting a similar set of reforms for early retirees (i.e., those not yet eligible for 
Medicare) would save nearly $18 billion over ten years. See Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., supra 
note 138. 
 140. This Part assumes that Medicare remains in place but that employers no longer 
play any role in providing or subsidizing health insurance for retirees. The risk is particularly 
significant for the early retirees who do not have access to Medicare.  
 141. With this paradigm in mind, consulting companies, brokers, and insurers have 
been promoting so-called private exchanges that allow individual employers to offer 
employees multiple plans with different sets of benefit options. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY 8 (2015). In a 2016 report, for example, 
the New Jersey Pension and Health Benefit Study Commission recommended providing state 
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bear the longevity risk in this case, while the risk of rising healthcare costs shifts 
onto the plan participants.142 In the latter model—which follows the contours of the 
401(k) retirement plan and which has seen growing employer interest—employers 
shift to a defined contribution arrangement for retiree healthcare benefits.143 Rather 
than committing to provide a certain monthly benefit in retirement, employers 
provide annual dollar contributions during the employees’ working years. The 
contributions are channeled into individual “savings” accounts for retiree healthcare 
expenses. Upon leaving or retiring, employees can access the sums in their accounts. 
Employees bear the longevity risk and the risk of higher healthcare costs. Notably, 
however, under this model, employees bear no default risk, because employers are 
required to make their contributions on an annual basis and such contributions are 
protected from both employer and the employee creditors. 
As with pension benefits, any move away from the traditional defined-
benefit paradigm involves significant tradeoffs. Success depends on the generosity 
of the annual contributions or subsidies, the relevant vesting and portability 
provisions, and the ability of employees to manage the assets in their individual 
accounts. While this Article has identified certain challenges with the current form 
of employer-sponsored retiree healthcare benefits, it leaves a full examination of 
alternative models to future research. Longer life spans and costlier healthcare, 
together with the changing nature of work in the United States, make such research 
ever-more important. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfunded retiree healthcare obligations present serious challenges for 
public employers and employees alike. While the high cost of healthcare in 
retirement necessitates careful planning and preparation on the part of both parties, 
the entrenched ambiguity in traditional post-employment healthcare plans 
necessarily frustrates this aim. Over the last decade, GASB accounting standards 
have forced state and local governments to confront the liabilities associated with 
their retiree healthcare plans. Policymakers have responded with a flurry of activity 
in the halls of state government.144 Most states have begun to prefund the benefits, 
                                                                                                            
retirees with an annual funding allotment to purchase coverage through such a private 
exchange. The move would allow the state of New Jersey to reduce and cap its “exceedingly 
costly” contributions to retiree healthcare by offering a menu of plans that would, on average, 
result in higher out-of-pocket costs for participants. NEW JERSEY PENSION & HEALTH BENEFIT 
STUDY COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON HEALTH BENEFITS 2–3 (2016), 
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pdf/NJPensionCommission-Supplemental-Report-on-
Health-Benefits.pdf. 
 142. As with pension benefits and the cost-of-living adjustment, employers could 
potentially build in a cost-of-healthcare adjustment to share the risk with employees. 
 143. Observers have noted the growing popularity of various defined contribution 
arrangements including HRAs and retiree medical savings accounts. See, e.g., SEGAL 
CONSULTING, TRENDS: HEALTH PLAN NEWS AT A GLANCE FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR, SECOND 
QUARTER 2016 (2016), https://www.segalco.com/media/2483/trends-ps-2ndquarter2016.pdf 
(observing that public employers are considering defined contribution options for retirees). 
 144. In addition to all the legislation to establish trusts, legislators have, in recent 
years, introduced a variety of policy proposals to address retiree healthcare obligations in their 
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but the current legal framework regulating retiree healthcare benefits impedes 
serious funding efforts. At the same time, state and local governments are 
experimenting with new models for the provision of employer-sponsored health 
insurance. The coming years will undoubtedly bring significant changes to the form 
and financing of post-employment benefits. The hope is that such changes will 
mitigate the economic and legal uncertainty that currently characterizes retiree 
healthcare benefits in the public sector. 
  
                                                                                                            
own states. For example, the following legislation was introduced but ultimately failed: in 
California, Assembly Member Travis Allen introduced a bill to “prohibit a public agency, 
state employer, employee organization, or public employee from entering into a 
memorandum of understanding that provides postemployment health care benefits without a 
strategy for permanently prefunding members’ postemployment healthcare benefits.” 
Assembly Bill 537, Legis. 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). In Connecticut, State 
Representative Melissa Ziobron and others introduced a bill to “close the gap between state 
employee and private sector benefit plans and to make [the Connecticut] state budget 
responsive to current economic realities.” Proposed H.B. 5057, Feb. Sess. 2016 (Conn. 2016). 
In Kansas, the appropriations committee sought to “implement[] a health insurance exchange 
platform for public-employer retirees,” and to “eliminate[] retirees from participation in the 
state health care benefits program.” H.B. 2716, 86th Legis., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016).  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A1: Summary Statistics for 2014–2015 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Retiree Healthcare Trust Exists  0.65 0.47 
Retiree Healthcare Plan 
Administered by Retirement System  0.47 0.50 
Percent of ARC Contributed  63.36 37.51 
Funding Ratio  25.37 47.95 
Statute Provides for Actuarial 
Determination of Annual 
Contribution  
0.27 0.44 
Cost-Sharing Plans  0.39 0.49 
Judges-or Legislators-Only Plan 0.13 0.34 
Retiree Healthcare Liabilities-to- 
State-Personal-Income Ratio  0.05 0.09 
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year  0.19 4.03 
Funding Ratio for State Pension 
Plans in Prior Year 69.41 12.69 
Credit Rating AA- or Below in 
Prior Year 0.19 0.39 
Percent of State Public Employees 
Represented by Unions in Prior 
Year  
36.17 18.91 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE B1: Institutional Features, State Fiscal Health, and Plan Funding Levels in 
2015 Across Retiree Healthcare Plans with Trusts, Controlling for Size of Payroll 
This table replicates the findings of Table 7 but adds natural log of 
payroll as an approximation of plan size. Payroll data is not available for one plan 
in this subsample. Standard errors are clustered by state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination of Annual 
Contribution 34.658**
(16.598)
Plan Administered by Retirement System 3.731
(11.707)
Cost-Sharing Plan -7.252
(13.481)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 129.586**
(53.007)
Payroll 6.118
(4.431)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to Personal Income Ratio -432.701**
(168.286)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in Prior Year -0.848
(0.771)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 8.657**
(3.372)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year -6.950
(37.904)
Percentage of State Public Employees Represented by Unions in 
Prior Year 0.289
(0.418)
Constant -0.321
(47.189)
Observations 65
R-squared 0.515
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep. Var.= Funded Ratio 
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TABLE B2: Likelihood That Retiree Healthcare Plan with Trust Received at Least 
70% of ARC in 2014–2015 
This table presents a series of pooled logit regressions using a binary 
dependent variable that indicates whether a plan in given year has received at least 
70% of the ARC. The regressions include year dummies (not shown) and standard 
errors are clustered by state.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Statute Provides for Actuarial 
Determination of Annual Contribution 1.969*** 2.028*** 2.627** 2.630**
(0.743) (0.762) (1.046) (1.057)
Plan Administered by Retirement System 0.176 -0.187
(0.673) (0.728)
Cost-Sharing Plan -0.177 -0.471
(0.557) (0.472)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 1.483 0.610
(1.185) (1.046)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to 
Personal Income Ratio -29.581*** -29.553***
(11.431) (11.026)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 0.612*** 0.630***
(0.224) (0.211)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in 
Prior Year -0.084** -0.080*
(0.041) (0.042)
Percentage of State Public Employees 
Represented by Unions in Prior Year 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.018)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year 1.698** 1.544**
(0.760) (0.780)
Constant -0.928** -1.174* 5.469* 5.573*
(0.425) (0.599) (2.842) (2.997)
Observations 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.152 0.190 0.345 0.356
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Binary Dep. Var. = 1 if Percentage of ARC Contributed Equals or Exceeds 70
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TABLE B3: Likelihood That Retiree Healthcare Plan with Trust Had a Ratio of 
Assets to Liabilities That Equaled or Exceeded 10% in 2015 
This table presents a series of logit regressions using a binary dependent 
variable that indicates whether a plan in 2015 has reached a ratio of assets to 
liabilities that equals or exceeds 10%. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination of 
Annual Contribution 1.903** 2.028** 3.209* 3.182*
(0.761) (0.877) (1.730) (1.731)
Plan Administered by Retirement System 0.954 0.824
(0.877) (1.615)
Cost-Sharing Plan 0.532 0.364
(0.831) (1.232)
Judges or Legislators-Only Plan 1.767 0.540
(1.144) (0.822)
State Retiree Healthcare Liabilities to Personal 
Income Ratio -66.324** -68.193***
(26.013) (24.426)
State Cash Solvency in Prior Year 1.495*** 1.499***
(0.473) (0.452)
Funding Ratio for State Pension Plans in Prior 
Year -0.124* -0.124*
(0.071) (0.074)
Credit Rating AA- or Below in Prior Year 2.801*** 2.085*
(0.739) (1.178)
Percentage of State Public Employees 
Represented by Unions in Prior Year 0.039 0.030
(0.032) (0.037)
Constant -0.154 -1.198 9.424* 9.237
(0.402) (0.875) (4.974) (5.990)
Observations 66 66 66 66
R-squared 0.127 0.218 0.521 0.536
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Binary Dep. Var. = 1 if Funding Ratio Equals or Exceeds 10
